摘要： •We examine the effects of the split share structure reform on the leverage ratios.•Non-state-controlled firms reduce the leverage, and state-controlled firms do not.•State ownership plays a decisive role in leverage decisions. This paper examines the effects of China's split share structure reform on the leverage decisions of listed firms. The results show that there are two effects, multiple large shareholders and liquidity that affect the leverage ratio. In non-state controlled firms, multiple large shareholders are able to monitor the controlling shareholders which reduce the leverage ratio. However, in state-controlled firms, they collude with the controlling shareholders to expropriate through debt financing. State ownership plays a decisive role in driving multiple large shareholders to collude with the controlling shareholders. 出版者： Greenwich: Elsevier Inc 出版日期： 2015-08-01 出處： The Quarterly review of economics and finance, 2015-08, Vol.57, p.86-100 版權： 2014 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 版權： Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Aug 2015 識別號： ISSN: 1062-9769 識別號： EISSN: 1878-4259 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2014.10.003
