摘要： This paper studies the optimal insurance contract under disappointment theory. We show that, when the individuals anticipate disappointment, there are two types of optimal insurance contract. The first type contains a deductible and a coinsurance above the deductible. We find that zero marginal cost is just a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a zero deductible. The second type has no deductible and the optimal insurance starts with full coverage for small losses and includes a coinsurance above an upper value of the full coverage. 其他題名： Geneva Risk Insur Rev 出版者： London: Palgrave Macmillan 出版日期： 2012-09-01 出處： The Geneva risk and insurance review, 2012-09, Vol.37 (2), p.258-284 資源來源： JSTOR Business Collection 版權： 2012 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 版權： The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2012 識別號： ISSN: 1554-964X 識別號： ISSN: 1554-9658 識別號： EISSN: 1554-9658 識別號： DOI: 10.1057/grir.2012.2
