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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/104909


    Title: Insurance bargaining under ambiguity
    Authors: 黃瑞卿;Huang, Rachel J.;Huang, Yi-Chieh;Tzeng, Larry Y.
    Contributors: 管理學院財務金融學系
    Keywords: Ambiguity;Ambiguity aversion;Bargaining;Cooperation;Cooperative bargaining;Game theory;Games;Insurance;Insurance bargaining;Insurance coverage;Insurance premiums;Non-cooperative bargaining;Risk;Risk aversion;Studies
    Date: 2013-01-01
    Issue Date: 2026-04-23 12:01:18 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Elsevier;Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V
    Abstract: 摘要: This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity. •We examine both cooperative and non-cooperative insurance bargaining games.•In the presence of ambiguity, full coverage is optimal.•The optimal premium is higher in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity.•The optimal premium will increase with the degree of ambiguity aversion.•The optimal premium will increase with an increase in ambiguity.
    出版者: Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V
    出版日期: 2013-11-01
    出處: Insurance, mathematics & economics, 2013-11, Vol.53 (3), p.812-820
    資源來源: Elsevier ScienceDirect Journal Complete - AutoHoldings
    版權: 2013 Elsevier B.V.
    版權: Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Nov 2013
    識別號: ISSN: 0167-6687
    識別號: EISSN: 1873-5959
    識別號: DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001
    識別號: CODEN: IMECDX
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance] journal & Dissertation

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