摘要： ► We analyze earnings-based bonus compensation by using a real-options model. ► Ownership shares give managers incentives to use debt; earnings-based bonuses do not. ► Combining ownership shares and earnings-based bonuses leads to different results. ► This is due to specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions. This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides managers with incentives to issue debt, whereas the latter induces the opposite result, although consistent impacts are found for the two types of compensation on both agency costs and the optimal investment decisions of managers. When managerial compensation comprises both ownership shares and an earnings-based bonus, there are significant differences in the effects of these two types of performance compensation on managers’ optimal investment and financing decisions, agency costs, optimal debt ratios and credit spreads, as a result of the specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions. 出版者： Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V 出版日期： 2012-08-01 出處： Journal of banking & finance, 2012-08, Vol.36 (8), p.2389-2402 資源來源： Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete 版權： 2012 Elsevier B.V. 版權： Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Aug 2012 識別號： ISSN: 0378-4266 識別號： EISSN: 1872-6372 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.05.002 識別號： CODEN: JBFIDO
