In-house capability and supply chain decisions

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题名:	In-house capability and supply chain decisions
作者:	王曉雯;Balachandran, Kashi R.;Wang, Hsiao-Wen;Li, Shu-Hsing;Wang, Taychang
贡献者:	管理學院會計研究所
关键词:	Benchmarks;Contractors;Coordinated supply chains;Decision analysis;Game theory;In house;In-house capability;Information sharing;Informationsverbreitung;Kapazit�tsplanung;Lieferkette;Misappropriation;Outsourcing;Production management;Spieltheorie;Studies;Subcontractors;Supply chain management;Supply chains
日期:	2013-04-01
上传时间:	2026-04-23 12:58:21 (UTC+8)
出版者:	Elsevier BV;Oxford: Elsevier Ltd
摘要:	摘要： This study considers an internal production option for a contractor and analyzes its effect on the supply chain decisions when the contractor has innovated and the subcontractor has an incentive for opportunistic behavior. In contrast to the single disclosure threshold in the benchmark scenario where the contractor lacks in-house capability, we find two thresholds in the referred scenario. When information misappropriation is possible and the contractor has in-house capability, the contractor will organize a coordinated supply chain only when innovations fall between the two thresholds. Compared to the benchmark scenario, in-house capability has a positive effect on the contractor's incentive to innovate and an ambiguous effect on the subcontractor's incentive to invest in the production process. When the contractor needs to incur an extra cost to build in-house capability, the contractor keeps the same levels of investment compared to the case of no additional in-house capability cost, whereas the subcontractor increases the levels of investment. Furthermore, we find that in the presence of potential misappropriation on the part of the subcontractor, the higher the level of in-house capability, the less likely the contractor will be to outsource innovative products that generate higher profitability. This study can explain why firms strategically outsource low-end products and produce high-end products themselves. This study provides new results on the effects of in-house capability on the strategic interactions of parties in supply chains and, hence, on supply chain efficiency. ► We explore how in-house capability affects the contractor's supply chain decisions. ► The contractor with in-house capability has two thresholds in disclosing innovation. ► The contractor with in-house capability will outsource products that generate higher profitability. ► We provide new results about the effects of in-house capability on supply chain efficiency. 出版者： Oxford: Elsevier Ltd 出版日期： 2013-04-01 出處： Omega (Oxford), 2013-04, Vol.41 (2), p.473-484 版權： 2012 Elsevier Ltd 版權： Copyright Pergamon Press Inc. Apr 2013 識別號： ISSN: 0305-0483 識別號： EISSN: 1873-5274 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2012.01.003 識別號： CODEN: OMEGA6
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