中大學術數位典藏-NCU Institutional Repository-提供博碩士論文、考古題、期刊論文、研究計畫等下載:Item 987654321/106050
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 94201/94201 (100%)
Visitors : 81575979      Online Users : 3618
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/106050


    Title: Optimal privatization policy in the presence of network externalities
    Authors: 邱俊榮;Wang, Chia-Chi;Chiou, Jiunn-Rong
    Contributors: 管理學院經濟學系
    Keywords: Communications networks;Compatibility;Consumption;Cost analysis;Costs;Externalities;Externality;Incompatibility;Marginal costs;Networks;Privatization;Standardization;Studies;Telecommunications;Telecommunications industry;Telecommunications policy
    Date: 2015-01-01
    Issue Date: 2026-04-23 13:06:13 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Oxford University Press;Oxford: Oxford University Press
    Abstract: 摘要: This article explores the optimal privatization policy for industries with network externalities in consumption, such as the telecommunications industry. The optimal degree of privatization depends crucially on the scale of network externality, the degree of compatibility (which, in the telecommunications industry, corresponds to the level of standardization that facilitates compatibility across different networks), and the cost type. A positive network externality will decrease the optimal degree of privatization, providing the rate of increase of marginal cost remains below a threshold. The impact of compatibility on optimal privatization is less straightforward. For instance, if the scale of network externality is low, a higher compatibility will increase optimal privatization if the rate of increase in marginal cost is also low. However, given a high network externality, optimal privatization initially increases, but then decreases as compatibility increases. Furthermore, optimal privatization with complete incompatibility may even be lower than that with complete compatibility.
    出版者: Oxford: Oxford University Press
    出版日期: 2015-04-01
    出處: Oxford economic papers, 2015-04, Vol.67 (2), p.514-527
    資源來源: JSTOR Arts and Sciences II
    版權: Oxford University Press 2015
    版權: Copyright Oxford Publishing Limited(England) Apr 2015
    識別號: ISSN: 0030-7653
    識別號: EISSN: 1464-3812
    識別號: DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpu030
    識別號: CODEN: OXEPA8
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Economics] journal & Dissertation

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML23View/Open


    All items in NCUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明