本研究主要考慮一個單一製造商與單一零售商面對著傳統通路和直接銷售通路的多通路結構之下，討論損耗性商品的最佳訂價策略，使用兩種賽局均衡要使得通路利潤最大化，製造商必須決策直接通路價格，而零售商必須決策傳統通路價格，而兩通路結構的價格是會互相影響，換句話說，製造商不僅僅供應零售商產品，也會變成競爭對手，在考量製造商在直接通路和傳統通路的通路成本，以及零售商的傳統通路成本，建構出兩通路成員的成本結構。 進而透過Stackelberg 均衡和Nash 均衡來解決兩通路上的價格均衡，盡量達到雙贏的決策，在Nash 均衡中是次一級的替選方案，即雙方都以對手的現行策略，做出最佳的因應策略；Stackelberg 均衡是考慮若兩者間存在領導者（製造商）與追隨者（零售商）之層級關係時，領導者在做決定前，會衡量追隨者在領導者的決定下的因應之策。而得到兩種均衡的最佳訂價價格，達到各別均衡的最大利潤的訂價策略，並觀察兩通路成員的價格與利潤高低，來提供決策者做決策考量。 We consider a manufacture–retail supply chain for single perishable item consisting of a mix of a traditional retail channel and a direct channel. The demand is a linear function of price and price competition. We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own price to maximize their respective profits.We will compare with Stackelberg and Nash game in a mixed retail and direct channels of distribution system. In Stackelberg game, the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The manufacturer will decide his price of direct channel first, after the retailer will decide his price of traditional retail channel. In Nash game, the manufacturer and the retailer will optimize their own profit and decide their own price, respectively. In sensitivity analysis, we study the profits and prices of both parties under different game and analyze the effects of key parameters on their profits and price by simulation. Our research finds that Stackelberg game have better profit and more expensive price than Nash game.
