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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/29547


    Title: Government deposit insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig model
    Authors: McCulloch,JH;Yu,MT
    Contributors: 財務金融所
    Keywords: BANK RUNS;LIQUIDITY
    Date: 1998
    Issue Date: 2010-06-29 20:30:39 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 中央大學
    Abstract: The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their "sequential servicing constraint" to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing without tax-based deposit insurance, even when the number of "type 1" agents is stochastic, by employing a "contingent bonus contract." The threat of disintermediation noted by Jacklin [1987] in the nonstochastic case is still present but can be blocked by contractual trading restrictions. This article complements Wallace [1988], who considers an alternative resolution of this inconsistency.
    Relation: GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE THEORY
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融研究所] 期刊論文

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