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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/42159


    Title: 公共工程履約風險分配制度研究(I);Study on Risk Allocation of Contract Performance in Public Works (I)
    Authors: 謝定亞
    Contributors: 營建管理研究所
    Keywords: 土木水利工程類
    Date: 2005-07-01
    Issue Date: 2010-11-30 15:12:51 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 行政院國家科學委員會
    Abstract: 公共工程採購雖有具體的標的,但大量營建風險之存在使履約管理之本質更形複雜。當事有差錯時,法律協助兩造決定由誰負擔法律上的責任。若契約有事先協議約定,法律退至場外,但遇契約條款違反法律強行或禁止規定之情形,契約法再次進場,以決定責任由誰負擔。換言之,法律亦參與分配風險。營建工程之風險由業主移轉至廠商身上時,廠商若無法取得適當之對價,則契約即有違背公平正義之虞。但在最低價決標之情形中,得標者往往是對風險報價最低者。若客觀上風險不因人而異,則得標者在不足對價之情形下為何願意犧牲?關鍵或許不在於其吸收控制或再移轉風險之能力,而是其規避風險之盤算最可能達成。這種現象可能將業主引到一個零合,甚至雙輸的賽局。有效的公共工程履約管理,其本旨即在如何進行合於經濟效率的風險分配,使風險移轉之對價能降至最低;此外,一旦兩造進入賽局,好的履約管理模式,促進雙方妥協,降低交易成本注意到總體效益,與避免損害擴大,並且帶領兩造專注在專案目標之達成。 When entering into a contract, the parties exchange consideration by assent. If considerable risks are involved in contract performance, it is possible that their existence as well as the consequential events will render the contract in frustration, i.e. impossible to perform. A mutually non-cooperative game is formed between the parties. In construction, such a hold-up condition is commonplace. In theory, the rules governing a construction contract are much the same as those governing a generic service procurement one. In practice, the same set of rules seldom suffices in construction. Myriad of decisions must be made rationally, in order to push forward the daily progress of a construction project. Without such decision-making, very few construction projects can be performed autonomously via a contract. This work aims at contemplating the rationality involved in resolving major contractual bottlenecks in construction contract. It is perceived that bounded rationality is relative. Experience in construction contract management can be transformed into merits for contract clauses, so that a close-to-complete contract can be envisaged. The key concept employed in the work is concerned with the prospering theories of law and economics. In that, the idea of justice, equity and efficiency in contract is reasoned whenever possible. Civil codes are so challenged, that the overall efficiency of the construction industry is at stake. The key contribution of this work is solid criticisms and recommendations to why and how the contracting practices in construction must be revolutionized. 研究期間:9308 ~ 9407
    Relation: 財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心
    Appears in Collections:[營建管理研究所 ] 研究計畫

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