隨著人工生殖科技乃至於胚胎幹細胞等科學研究的日新月益，有關於胚胎之道德地位的討論，及其伴隨而來的相關倫理爭議，也逐漸白熱化。本論文藉由文獻研究及辨證之哲學方法，集中討論其中一主要論題，即胚胎是否是位格人，從而具有不容任意侵犯之生命權等道德與法律權益。在一方面檢視目前有關於胚胎位格人地位之支持與反對的論述，另一方面分析胚胎生物學之科學文獻中所使用的概念，及其倫理的相關性，本論文指出，「胚胎是位格人」的主張並非字面表達，而是隱喻，非僅如此，有關於胚胎的論述絕大多數更係由隱喻所構成，因而有必要從隱喻道德的進路，來釐清生命初始階段所涉及的變與不變，表現型的生成變化，與基因型的一致，究竟該如何加以隱喻地理解。此一研究典範的改弦異轍，從原則主義到隱喻道德，至少證明了一件事，那就是胚胎雖具有某些道德價值，得立法加以保障，卻不是位格人，不具有如同成人般嚴格意義的生命權。 With the rapid growth of new technologies in IVF and the embryonic stem cell research, the debate of the moral status of the early life has been brought into the forth front. This paper is going to focus on one of the vital issues, i.e. whether the embryo is a person with the right to life in terms of morality and law. After a detail survey and clarification of the pro and con of the crucial concepts, so called ‘the personhood of the embryo’, as well as ‘the right to life of the embryo’, and the related moral implications and reasons for or against them in both bioethical and scientific literature, this paper argues that these concepts and other discourse constituents of them are by no means literal but metaphorical ones. Therefore, it is in need to shift our ethical paradigm from the ethical principlism to the metaphorical morality, in order to know how can and should we metaphorically conceptualize and understand the changing phenotype and unchangeable genotype of the early stage of the human life. At last, this paper concludes with one statement, that is, although the embryo is with some moral significance, allowable to grant some protection and respect by the regulations of law in terms of specific contexts and needs, it is not a person, nor with right to life in a strict sense.
