本研究探討在一對多的兩階垂直分散組織的通路下，如何利用銷售商管理庫存及寄賣機制來達成通路協同，以期使整體通路及個別參與者皆能增加獲利。本研究假設產品之銷售不但受到其售價影響，而且和其即時存貨水準成正比。該產品之存貨具有隨時間消逝而損壞或衰退的特質，一如生鮮食品或3C產品。本研究以單期銷售的基本EOQ模式為基準下，對協同及非協同的供應商兩種狀況，用數量模式找出通路利潤最佳化及個別均衡分析。本研究模式分為傳統存貨批發價契約、銷售商管理庫存契約及銷售商管理庫存加寄賣機制三種情況探討。另外一種特殊的非協同銷售商管理庫存加寄賣情況中，我們利用兩部分利潤分享機制，即藉由每單位產品佣金及單筆補貼金來達到此非協同情況的柏拉圖改善。本研究還利用供應商及零售商之效率前緣概念，對VMI加寄賣機制中協調及非協同情況用圖形描述單位佣金及單筆補貼金之可行範圍，並標示出柏拉圖改善區域。最後利用數據分析，找出單筆補貼金在各種佣金下的最大及最小值，並針對本模式中之參數進行其對通路利潤、市場定價及補貨週期進行敏感性分析，結果顯示決策變數對存貨影響因子有相當大的敏感度，此一現象值得研究者及業者重視。本研究結論不但提供供應鏈管理上的涵義，且提供管理者決策的重要依據。 This research explores the performance of coordinating a two-echelon vertically decentralized distribution system consisting of one vendor and multiple retailers under vendor-managed inventory and consignment arrangements. The demand for the deteriorating product is decreasing in retail price conventionally and, especially dependent on stock level at retailers. Under a single selling period setting, an EOQ pricing setting model is used as a benchmark. The distribution system is modeled as profit-maximization problems in which the wholesaler could behave as a cooperative or non-cooperative player. Under both scenarios, the performances of the distribution system are analyzed compared with that in the benchmark model. Additionally, with a self-interested wholesaler, this context conducts an equilibrium analysis under a revenue-sharing scheme, i.e., joint commission fee and a lump sum side-payment to align the players in a non-cooperative scheme. Through properly designed contract terms on the amount of payments, the channel attains Pareto improvements, that is, each party at least gets better-off without making its counterpart worse-off. Furthermore, a feasible closed area of Pareto improvements is visualized geographically by participants’efficient frontiers under specific commission fees. A sensitivity analysis is performed to characterize the impacts on the channel-wide profits and on the decision variables arising from the demand and inventory parameters. The research reveals that a non-cooperative wholesaler tends to price higher and stock less, which could even undermine the channel-wide performance. However, this decision bias can be rectified by the wholesaler using the proposed two-part tariff revenue-sharing mechanism.
