| 摘要: | 康熙前期，中國將一向被視為海外之地、蕞爾小島──臺灣納入版圖，是什麼原因讓中國不憚水土，不畏波濤，決定攻臺？近代國家基於國防、交通、經濟……等理由寸土必爭、寸土不讓，光緒二十一年（1895），中國為何又同意割讓臺灣？改變了臺灣的歷史進程和方向。因此本文透過明、清的實錄、奏疏、往來的信件、電報和私人日記、筆記，以及已經翻譯成中文的荷蘭聯合東印度公司（VOC）日誌，以史學研究法予以研究。 中國在明朝時開始跟臺灣密切接觸，臺灣因此進入「天下」之中。清朝在鄭成功北征南京失敗後，已完全征服大陸，並打算乘勢將鄭成功的黨羽一舉打垮。鄭成功在季風航線上的臺灣、呂宋、長崎中，選擇以臺灣為根本之地，以安頓將領家眷、生聚教訓，進而反清復明。 相對的，對康熙帝而言，如果不能避免前明餘黨鄭成功的實力再次壯大，就會存在威脅其皇位的可能性，因此一定要攻臺，將其勢力徹底消滅。多位福建大員，則是基於與海外貿易的密切關連性，支持攻臺主張。 光緒二十一年（1895），中國在中日戰爭中戰敗。在日軍北路兵鋒及於山海關，南路則攻下威海衛，隨時都可能攻陷北京的情況下，清朝政府不得不同意割讓臺灣，簽訂馬關條約。 簡單來說，攻占臺灣卅割讓臺灣，在兩種相反決策之間的取捨，明、清在不同時期的決定，同樣是基於以政權安危為優先的宏觀考量。 During the early reign of Emperor K’ang-hsi, China incorporated Taiwan, which had been considered a diminutive island on a distant sea, into her territory. What prompted China to invade Taiwan – in spite of possible epidemics on the island and the dangers of the sea? Yet, what caused China to relinquish her ownership of Taiwan in the 21st year of Kuang-hsu’s reign (1895 AD) and thus change the course of Taiwan’s history while other countries in the world were vying for additions to their territories – for strategic, logistic, and economic advantages – at every possible opportunity? This paper seeks to answer these questions with the historiography of Taiwan, as well as an analytical research into the documents from the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties, including the Veritable Records (shih-lu, 實錄), memorials and reports to the thrones, letters, telegrams, personal journals and notes, and the journals of The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC), which are translated into Chinese. China’s association with Taiwan began in the Ming dynasty, which caused the island to be considered part of “Land under Heaven” (天下). When Cheng Ch'eng-kung (鄭成功) failed in his attempt to seize the city of Nan-king(南京), the first rulers of the Ch’ing dynasty had already conquered most of China and intended to bring Cheng Ch'eng-kung under their reins by obliterating his forces and defeating hisfollowers. As a result, among the strategic points of Taiwan, Luzon, and Nagasaki -- all located on the monsoon route -- Cheng Ch'eng-kung chose Taiwan to rebuild his forces, arrange for his military leaders and their families to settle, and establish a base of operation for the cause of “overthrowing Ch’ing, restoring Ming” (反清復明). With Cheng Ch'eng-kung leading the remnants of the Ming dynasty, failure to keep him from ever rebuilding and expanding his forces again would undoubtedly result in imminent threats to Emperor K’ang-hsi’s sovereignty. To secure his throne, the emperor had no other option other than to annihilate Cheng Ch'eng-kung’s anti-Ch’ing forces. This approach was supported by the ranking officials in the region of Fu-chien (福建) on the basis that the takeover of Taiwan is closely related to the overseas trading in that region. In the 21st year of Kuang-hsu’s reign (1895 AD), China suffered defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. As a result, Beijing was on the brink of falling under siege -- with the Japanese troops almost taking over Shanhai Pass (山海關) from the north and meanwhile claiming Weihaiwei (威海衛) in the north. Consequently, the Ch’ing administration was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, thus relinquishing the ownership of Taiwan. Overall, when the rulers of both the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties chose between taking over Taiwan and relinquishing the ownership of it -- two conflicting and contradictory choices indeed -- it was a measure resulting from macroscopic consideration to secure the sovereignty of the dynasty as their first priority. |
