在實施沙賓法案後美國證期局規定公開發行公司審計委員會應至少有一位財務專家。本篇研究欲檢視審計委員會財務專家及CEO誘因薪酬對於公司績效及盈餘管理之影響。我們使用2005至2007共計2756筆樣本觀察值包含審計委員會財務專家、CEO誘因薪酬、董事會特質及公司特質的資料。研究結果顯示當審計委員會財務專家之人數越多及占審計委員會的比例越高與盈餘管理呈負向關係，而對於公司績效及未受操縱盈餘皆呈正向關係。根據結果我們認為審計委員會財務專家透過具專業性的監督能夠藉由降低盈餘管理提高財務報導的品質，進而透過監督令CEO能夠專注於公司的經營管理上並增加公司的真實績效。另一方面，我們也發現給予越多CEO誘因薪酬的公司會導致CEO從事更多盈餘管理，此外也發現CEO誘因薪酬和未受操縱盈餘無關聯性。實證結果支持審計委員會財務專家能夠有助公司減輕盈餘管理進而增加公司績效之公司治理機制以及CEO誘因薪酬使CEO為增加自我財富而窗飾財務報表，也顯示給予較多CEO誘因薪酬對於公司真實績效並無幫助。 Due to SOX 407, SEC requires public traded company to have at least one member with financial background on audit committee. We examine the impact of the audit committee financial expertise and CEO incentive pay on unmanaged performance eliminated the effect of earning management from firm performance. In this paper we use 2756 firms included audit committee financial expertise data, CEO incentive pay, board characteristics and firm characteristics. We find a negative relation between the number and ratio of financial expertise on audit committee and discretionary accruals and a positive relation between the number and ratio of financial expertise on audit committee and unmanaged performance. Firm with more financial expertise on audit committee can enhance the quality of financial report and through the monitoring of financial expertise on audit committee CEO can pay more attention to firm operation. Moreover, we find a positive relation between CEO incentive pay and discretionary accruals and no relation between CEO incentive pay and unmanaged performance. Therefore, our results show audit committee with financial expertise can be a good corporate governance mechanism to ease the earnings management and better firm performance, and we indicate CEO given more incentive pay will increase firm performance by using discretionary accruals and they do no good to unmanaged performance.
