本研究旨在探討管理者是否會操縱真實營業活動以避免公司盈餘數字呈現虧損。本研究亦比較家族與非家族企業管理者跨越盈餘門檻所採用之盈餘管理方式(真實營業活動或應計項目之盈餘管理)。本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果顯示管理者確實會為了避免報導虧損而操縱真實營業活動。此外，本研究亦發現真實營業活動與應計項目之盈餘管理兩者間存在替代關係。尤其，報導小額盈餘的公司中，家族企業採用較多的應計項目盈餘管理，較不願意操縱真實營業活動；然而，非家族企業操縱較多真實營業活動部分，而較少對應計項目進行盈餘管理。 This study investigates whether managers engage in manipulating real activities to avoid small losses. I also compare the earnings management mechanisms (i.e., real activity manipulation and accrual management) by which managers use to avoid small losses across family firms and nonfamily firms. Using a sample of Taiwan’s listed firms, I provide evidence that managers manipulate real activities to avoid small losses. In addition, I find that firms use real and accrual manipulations as substitutes in managing earnings. In particular, for firms just reporting small profits, family firms use more accruals and less real earnings management; however, nonfamily firms use less accruals and more real earnings management.
