中大機構典藏-NCU Institutional Repository-提供博碩士論文、考古題、期刊論文、研究計畫等下載:Item 987654321/51665
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 80990/80990 (100%)
造访人次 : 40299502      在线人数 : 480
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧:
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号",以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻,建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段,可获得较完整数据
  • 进阶搜寻


    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51665


    题名: On channel coordination through revenue-sharing contracts with price and shelf-space dependent demand
    作者: Chen,JM;Cheng,HL;Chien,MC
    贡献者: 工業管理研究所
    关键词: SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION;VIDEO RENTAL INDUSTRY;CONSIGNMENT CONTRACT;SLOTTING ALLOWANCES;RETAIL SPACE;COMPETITION;INVENTORIES;PERFORMANCE;DECISIONS;QUANTITY
    日期: 2011
    上传时间: 2012-03-27 19:02:08 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: This paper deals with the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under a consignment contract with revenue sharing. We consider the demand of the downstream player, e.g., the retailer, being price and shelf-space sensitive. Under such a setting, the retailer decides on the revenue-sharing percentage and the slotting fee. And the upstream player, e.g., the manufacturer, decides on the retail price and the size of shelf-space. For each item sold, the retailer deducts an agreed-upon percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the manufacturer. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game, and carry out equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel, with and without cooperation. In addition, a profit sharing scheme through a two-part slotting allowance is proposed, which leads to Pareto improvements among channel participants. Our analysis reveals that the noncooperative game tends to set a higher revenue-sharing percentage and lower slotting fee by the retailer, and a higher retail price and less display space by the manufacturer, which leads to a lower channel profit. The consistent bias can be perfectly rectified by the cooperative game through the proposed two-part contractual agreement. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    關聯: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL MODELLING
    显示于类别:[工業管理研究所 ] 期刊論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    index.html0KbHTML679检视/开启


    在NCUIR中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明