| 摘要: | 摘要 葉公超在中華民國政府遷台後的外交史上曾扮演了一個重要的角色。其中葉公超曾參與並發揮較大影響力的，主要是在1952年的中日和平條約、1954年的中美共同防禦條約以及1961年底應對外蒙古入聯合國案等三件事情。 在1952年在中日雙邊和會的談判上，葉公超力爭中華民國擁有台澎的主權。在其全力交涉談判之下，所取得的成果有四，第一是關於條約性質的交涉。第二是是關於偽政權財產處理。第三是與財產問題有關的第三條問題。第四是解決「或」與「及」的爭議。在解決中日和會中的爭議之後，中日兩國終於順利簽訂了中日和約。 1952年中日和約簽訂之後，1954年中美共同防禦條約簽訂的過程，雖然葉公超在交涉過程中不時遭遇困難，但仍盡力在符合中華民國的利益之下完成條約的簽訂。交涉過程中葉公超與駐美大使顧維鈞合作，共同合作解決的問題有，第一、爭取美國同意開始談判中美共同防禦條約之前，同意防約有限定適用範圍的規定，並以紐案解決外島問題。第二、雙方約定在紐案提出之前對外界宣佈談判防約之事。第三、在適用範圍的問題上，確定限定於台灣與澎湖，但另外加上｢適用於互相同意所決定的其他領域」，亦即可擴充解釋至金門、馬祖。第四、在反攻大陸的問題上，實現蔣介石在採取反攻大陸的軍事行動之前，徵求美方同意的承諾。 1961年外蒙古入會案的問題，在此之前1955年的外蒙古案，葉公超與當時台北政府領導人蔣介石一樣，都認為必須動用否決權。然而到了1961年，由於美國對於外蒙古問題以及中國代表權問題的態度是，為保住中華民國在聯合國的代表權，不惜接受蘇聯所提茅利塔尼亞與外蒙古整批入會的交易，以拉攏亞非國家的勢力，因此美國希望中華民國政府不要動用否決權阻擋外蒙入會。葉公超為了上述配合美國的對華政策，以求取對中華民國最有利的外交局勢，其對外蒙古動用否決權的態度開始有了轉變，而這樣的轉變卻使得他最後不容於蔣而奉召返國。 葉公超的外交思維是中華民國擁有中國大陸及台澎地區的主權，但又深知美國立場及觀感的重要性。葉公超即是以此外交思維主持戰後中華民國外交。但另一方面，葉公超卻又有直言不諱的性格。在這樣性格之下，其外交主張若與上位者相同，則能相安無事，但若與上位者衝突，則易斷送政治生命。或許正如葉公超本人所說，其性格是不適合從事政治外交，然其對戰後中華民國外交做出的貢獻也不容抺滅。Yeh Kung-Chao and the diplomacy of Republic of China (1949-1961) Abstract Yeh Kung-Chao, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China, who had undeniably played an important role in the history of the diplomacy of Republic of China. His important contributions included conclusions of the “Treaty of Taipei (1952)”, “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China (1954)”, and the dealing with the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic into UN in 1961. In 1952, Yeh Kung-Chao strove to the sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu at the Sino-Japanese Peace negotiation. This meeting left us four main contributions: 1. Negotiation of the nature of the treaty. 2. The disposing of property of puppet regimes. 3. The problem related to the property mentioned in the third article. 4. The solution of the argument on the meanings of terms "or" and "and". After the conclusion of “Treaty of Taipei” in 1952, Yeh Kung-Chao still tried hard helping to bring about the “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” in 1954. Although he experienced a lot of difficulties through the process, he completed the mission of signing treaty in the interest of Republic of China. During this negociation Yeh Kung-Chao was in concert with the ambassador to the United States, Vi-Kyuin, Koo and their contributions mentioned above are the following: 1.The consensus of the scope of application on "Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty" and seeking New Zealand for proposing the UN a resolution prohibiting changes of Taiwan Strait relationship 2. Both sides agreed to declare the defense treaty before the case proposed by NZ; 3. On the scope of application, the consensus on the limitation to Taiwan and Penghu, moreover, they reached an agreement on “the other areas” which was expanded to Kinmen and Matsu; 4. On the “Retaking the Chinese Mainland” policy, it fulfilled the Chiang Kai-Shek’s promise that Taiwan should strive for the grant of U.S. government’s before retake the Chinese Mainland. In 1961 as the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic into the United Nations, Yeh Kung-Chao and Chiang Kai-Shek both recognized that to use veto power on this issue was necessary. However, the situation was changed in 1961. As a result of the dispute between the U.S.A. and Taiwan on the deputy right of the Republic of Mongolia, the U.S. government accepted the agreement of the UN membership of Mauritania and the Republic of Mongolia required by CCCP to ensure representation of Taiwan in UN. Based on this position, the U.S. government expected that Taiwan had better not to use veto power to overrule the Republic of Mongolia from joining UN. In order to keep the relationship between U.S. government and Taiwan, Yeh Kung-Chao chose to operate in coordination with U.S. government and shifted his ground to the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic into the UN. As a result of this shift, Yeh Kung-Chao was summoned to come back Taiwan. Yeh Kung-Chao’s diplomatic thinking was that the Republic of China owned the sovereignty of Mainland China, Taiwan and Penghu. But, at the same time he also gave consideration to the importance of the position of U.S. government. On the other hand, he gave the honest opinion throughout his life. In this regard, it’s easy to forfeit his career if he held the opposite or different opinions with the superior. According to Yeh Kung-Chao’s saying, his personality was not suit for being a public employment. But we still cannot eliminate Yeh Kung-Chao’s contribution to the diplomatic history of our country. |
