沙賓法案於2002年公布草案後，引起各界熱烈討論並批評財務專家之定義過於嚴苛，因此美國證券交易委員會於2003年頒布之沙賓法案最終版放寬了對財務專家之要求。在此背景下，本文欲探討財務專家是否仍具備監督功能。本篇論文使用2004年至2007年共計1357筆樣本，觀察當面臨盈餘壓力時，公司是否設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家是否超過一人(大於法令下限)及財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會之成員時，對於應計盈餘管理-裁決性應計數與實質盈餘管理-買回庫藏股之影響。研究結果發現，當公司面臨盈餘壓力時，若設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家超過一人(超過法令下限)時，均能有效抑制應計盈餘管理之發生，但當財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會成員時卻無法抑制應計盈餘管理之發生。而在實質盈餘管理方面，當公司設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家超過一人(超過法令下限)及財務專家同時兼任審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員時，皆無法抑止實質盈餘管理-買回庫藏股之發生。In 2002, the SEC issued its proposal on 407, including a tentative and restricted definition of a financial expert, which raised lots of concerns. To accommodate these concerns, the SEC expanded the definition of a financial expertise in 2003. Under this situation, does financial expertise improve a firm’s corporate governance environment?In this paper we use 1357 suspect firms from 2004 to 2007, which face earnings pressures, to examine the impact of whether audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit committee and compensation committee on discretionary earnings management and real earnings management.We find that audit committee with financial expertise and audit committee with more than one financial expertise reduce discretionary earnings management, and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee induce discretionary earnings management. Audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee have no association between real earnings management-stock repurchase.
