本研究之發想是來自Vafeas (1999) 及Sun and Cahan (2009) 兩篇文獻，前者係探討企業在遴選薪委會成員時偏好選用資歷較深、年齡較長、兼任情況較少之獨立董事，而後者發現當薪委會品質為顯著影響高階經理人現金薪酬反應會計績效表現敏感度之因素。 本研究係針對2014年9月底前，已由獨立董事組成薪委會之企業為樣本，探討這些企業在2010年至2011年間，高階經理人現金薪酬變動與會計績效變動之敏感度是否將受到獨立董事特質之影響，這些特質分別為獨立董事之兼任情形、年資、參與會議次數、兼任其他委員會成員情形等四項，以期作為企業未來聘任獨立董事加入薪委會時之參考。 本研究指出薪委會中獨立董事年資與獨立董事參與會議次數皆為正向提升薪委會品質，進而顯著加強高階經理人現金薪酬反應會計績效表現敏感度之獨立董事特質。 This research is inspired from two articles, Vafeas (1999) and Sun and Cahan (2009). Vafeas (1999) discusses the determinants of company board committee membership position seniority, age preference, and less additional board sites. Sun and Cahan (2009) describes the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance which are effected by the quality of the compensation committee. The quality of the compensation committee is therefore significantly affected by the characteristics of committee membership. The target group of this research is the companies by which, the end of September 2014, their compensation committees are composed of independent directors. This essay evaluates if the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance are influenced by independent directors. Characteristics of "independent directors" are additional board seats, position seniority, company meeting attendance frequency, and their membership of other committees. This research finds that director tenure and frequency of attendance at company meetings are two important independent director characteristics. These two characteristics can improve the quality of the compensation committee as well as enhance the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance. Therefore, as mentioned, the quality of the compensation committee is significantly affected by the characteristics of committee membership and can only benefit from annual research.
