本研究使用2005年到2012年美國公司資料為樣本，探討高階經理人誘因薪酬、審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與公司生產效率之間的關聯性。本研究使用SFA模型(Stochastic Frontier Analysis Model)來衡量公司生產效率，其生產函數所產生的參數與無效率效果是同時評估計算的。在控制產業類別後，公司高階經理人誘因薪酬與公司生產效率為正相關；審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與公司生產效率呈現負相關；最後研究公司在審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊的公司治理情況下，高階經理人誘因薪酬與公司生產效率關係是否會受影響以及如何影響，發現高階經理人誘因薪酬與審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊比率的交乘項與公司生產效率為負相關，足以顯示公司治理與董事會制度的重要性。總而言之，結果顯示在評估公司生產效率和公司經濟表現時，高階經理人薪酬結構與董事會結構為重要考量因素之一。;This study uses 2005-2012 data of all the US firms. We examine the relationship between CEO incentive compensation, compensation/audit committees overlap and technical productive efficiency. We use stochastic frontier analysis model which the parameters of a stochastic frontier function are estimated simultaneously with the inefficiency effects. After controlling for the industry, CEO incentive compensation is positively related to productive efficiency. However, compensation/audit committees overlap is negatively related to productive efficiency. Last, we examine whether and how the relationship between CEO incentive compensation and productive efficiency will be influenced under compensation/audit committees overlap. We find that the intersection of CEO incentive compensation and compensation/audit committees overlap is negatively related to productive efficiency. It implies the importance of corporate governance and board structure. In sum, the results suggest that both the structure of CEO compensation and board are important factors when assessing the productive efficiency and economic performance of firms.
