美國沙賓法案於2002年後要求公開發行公司設立審計委員會，本研究旨在探討當審計委員會成員同時任職薪酬委員會時，是否能透過知識外溢的效果，提供更好的監督品質。首先測試經理人之權益薪酬與較高的經理人風險承擔是否有關係，以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對經理人風險承擔之影響。隨後探討透過薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊是否能改善因為權益薪酬而導致之經理人風險承擔的水準。 研究結果發現經理人之權益薪酬會導致較高的經理人風險承擔，以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對於經理人風險承擔有負向的影響。本研究結果也顯示雖然審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊能隨低企業風險承擔，但是其對於權益薪酬與企業風險承擔之間的關係是既沒有正向影響也沒有負向影響的。 ;The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) requires that the audit committee be set by public companies. This study examines whether there’s the effect of knowledge spillover to provide a better monitoring when firms’ audit and compensation committees overlap. First, we investigate whether there’s a relationship between board overlapping and market measure of risk for a sample of industrial companies during the period of 2002-2012, and whether executive equity compensation have influence on risk-taking of firms. Then, we examined the effect of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees in the relationship between executive equity compensation and risk-taking. As a result, the equity-based compensation hold by executives induces firm risk-taking, while director overlap is negatively associated with risk-taking. The research results also suggest that the overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees is not associated with the relationship between executive equity compensation and firm risk-taking.
