| 摘要: | 在民事訴訟中, 被告與原告雙方需要花費不少成本打官司, 是個浪費社會資源並且沒有實質生產的活動。倘若能找出讓訴訟雙方願意庭外和解的條件, 則可省去不少打官司的成本。本論文以實驗方式研究人們在法庭情境下的風險偏好, 並且藉由估計主觀的機率評價, 找出原告與被告願意庭外和解的條件。過去有許多研究風險決策的實驗, 實驗內容大多是透過受試者在兩張彩券間作風險決策, 以估計人們的風險偏好。這類的實驗沒有給受試者任何的情境, 背後隱含一個假設: 風險決策和事件內容兩者相互獨立。本實驗希望藉由比較法庭情境下與傳統的實驗情境下的實驗結果, 以驗證此假設是否正確。實驗過程中, 受試者除了和另一位受試者互動, 本實驗也設計和電腦進行互動, 以比較當風險決策有涉及到他人時主觀的機率評價會不會改變。本實驗結果發現:(1) 情境效果只有在面對損失時, 才會影響主觀的機率評價, 並且法庭情境下主觀的機率評價會比較接近真實的機率;面對獲得時, 法庭情境不會影響主觀的機率評價。(2) 風險決策與其他人有關聯時, 只有面對損失時才會影響主觀的機率評價。(3) 當訴訟雙方為一位原告與一位被告、或者一位原告與兩位被告的時候, 雙方有極大的機會達成和解。;Demanding a significant charge from both parties in the lawsuit,the civil action has long been criticized as an unproductive waste of the social resource.However, such cost can be reducible once the conditions allowing an "out-of-court settlement" are met.In this research, we investigate people′s risk preference under civil litigation through experiment,in order to figure out the conditions of an out-of-court settlement.The prior researches on risk preference based on subjects′ choices between monetary gambles had often assumed that people′s risk preferences and decisions under risk and under uncertainty have little to do with the actual facts calling for such decisions. In the experiment,
we investigate the validity of the above assumption by comparing the probability weighting function among different scenarios.To compare the risk preferences when risk decisions are correlated with others,subjects were made to interact with the computer as well as another subject.The result of our designed experiment led us to the conclusion
that the probability weighting function of civil litigation is different from monetary gambles for losses,and that the probability weighting function is different when risk decisions are correlated with others for losses.According to our data, an out-of- court settlement is most possible when there is only one plaintiff facing one defendant,or when there is one plaintiff facing two defendants. |
