當代伊川哲學研究之爭議與出路—重新釐清牟宗三批判伊川哲學的合理性;Contemporary Debate Concerning Chen Yi′s Philosophy and its Solution: Reevaluating Mou Tsung-san′s Critique of Chen Yi′s Philosophy

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题名:	當代伊川哲學研究之爭議與出路—重新釐清牟宗三批判伊川哲學的合理性;Contemporary Debate Concerning Chen Yi′s Philosophy and its Solution: Reevaluating Mou Tsung-san′s Critique of Chen Yi′s Philosophy
作者:	陳志杰;Chen,Zhi-jie
贡献者:	哲學研究所
关键词:	伊川;牟宗三;唐君毅;逆覺體證;Chen Yi;Mou Tsung-san;Tang Jun-yi;ni-chüeh-t′i-cheng
日期:	2016-08-30
上传时间:	2016-10-13 13:48:37 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	本文的問題意識可以分為宏觀的和微觀的，宏觀的問題意識主要處理圍繞在當代學界對伊川哲學研究上的爭議；微觀的問題意識的重點在於，如何理解牟先生對伊川的詮釋。當代新儒家的代表人物牟宗三先生認為伊川哲學之內容是理無活動義、心性情三分，但同為當代新儒家的代表人物唐君毅先生卻認為伊川哲學之內容似是理有活動義、心性情為一。目前學界對兩位先生之詮釋皆各有所支持與反對，但其中特定學者以唐先生之論而批判牟先生之詮釋，且尚未見其他學者對這些批判進行回應。且依特定學者之論點，似乎隱含唐牟兩位先生的詮釋不能調和。為何牟先生要將伊川哲學定為理不活動、理氣二分、心性二分是因為伊川的工夫論是有問題的。筆者以為牟先生實際上是發現到了這個問題，才那麼確切將伊川哲學定為如此。因此，面對當代伊川哲學研究上的爭議，筆者提出的兩個觀點是：(1)以往重視由伊川的理氣論建構心性論、再由心性論建構工夫論。但本論文中將以工夫論開始論述。(2)依上述唐牟兩位先生對伊川的詮釋似為不同。但筆者認為兩位先生的詮釋實可以相通。牟先生認為正宗儒學之體證方式是逆覺體證。伊川的工夫論是格物窮理之工夫，而非是逆覺體證之工夫。後者不能證明理氣為一，心性為一，前者則可以。唐先生詮釋伊川的理似有活動義，與心性情三者似可以為一之面向。但唐先生的詮釋面向實則可以與牟先生的詮釋相通。且唐牟兩位先生對於伊川哲學的詮釋，才能符合伊川原意。杜保瑞和劉樂恒順唐先生詮釋而言，實不能與唐先生詮釋內涵相應，且二者之詮釋不能符合伊川原意。 ;The problematic of this thesis has a macro and a micro aspect. The former is a response to the contemporary controversy of Cheng Yi-Chuan and the latter is upon the renowned Neo-Confucian Professor Mou Tsung-san’s explication of Cheng’s philosophy. Mou points out that in the philosophy of Cheng Yi-Chuan, Li (reason) has no activity and xin-xing-qing is a triad division with the xin and qing belong to the phenomenon and xing belongs to the metaphysical world. While the equally renowned contemporary Neo-Confucian Professor Tang Chun-I seems to assert that Cheng’s Li is active and that xin-xing-qing is one. Both interpretations have supporters while some of those following Tang’s line of explications have up to now not subjected to criticism, and some of them think that the two could not be reconciled. Mou draws his conclusion because there is some fundamental flaws in Cheng’s method of moral cultivation. My point is precisely that Mou realizes this problem in Cheng’s philosophy and is certain that for Cheng Li is inactive, Li and Chi are separated and so is xin and xing. Hence, I suggest that (1) traditional interpretations of Cheng’s philosophy starting with the theory of Li and Chi and then construct his ideas of xin and xing is inappropriate. Instead, I begin with his theory of moral cultivation. And (2), that though Mou’s and Tang’s interpretations seem to be different but in fact could be compatible. Professor Mou points out that the method of moral cultivation for orthodox Confucianism is ni-chüeh t′i-cheng (逆覺體證), while Cheng’s is ge-wu qiong-li(格物窮理). The former could while the latter could not prove that xin and xing is oneness. Tang’s interpretation emphasizes upon the double-aspect of xin in its unity of xing and qing. However, his does not assert that the two are oneness. His interpretation must not be confused with Tu Bo-rui or Lau Lok-heng. Both of Mou and Tang’s interpretations are more in unity with Cheng’s writings.
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