| 摘要: | 隨著現代科技技術及商業模式之急速變化及蓬勃發展，企業經營之方式亦須隨之調整，使其更為彈性、開放，以維持商業上之競爭力。然而傳統的股東權內涵過於強調形式的股份（東）平等原則，在現行法制下顯得過於僵化而不夠合於時宜。本文以為，在契約自由、投資人自我行為負責原則之下，主管機關不應過度干涉股東及公司對於股權交易之內容之設計，僅在有損於公共利益或對股東利益影響重大時方得以最低限度介入。
在突破傳統僵化的形式股份（東）平等原則後，股權分離之設計可為不同於一股一權之設計，此種股權結構之設計即為雙重股權結構（Dual-Class Shares）。而雙重股權結構目前仍為一具有爭議性之制度，故而本文對此種結構之緣起、發展、基礎理論、應用及支持與反對論點作一介紹，希冀讀者可透過本文之介紹對雙重股權結構有所認識，並對之為適當評價。
而關於經營階層採用雙重股權結構一事應如何評價，Williams v. Geier案並不單純以違反股份（東）平等原則而認為經營階層違反受任人義務，而係分別就不同面向一一檢討；至於發行雙重股權結構對股東之是否有利一事，應就經濟利益、表決權利益、股東同意品質及司法審查個案分析，而Google公司發行C類股之事件值得參考。
而本文另介紹及分析阿里巴巴合夥人會議制度，作為我國未來法制上之參考。最後，本文以為，理論上並無充分的禁止雙重股權結構之正當性，惟以我國目前證券市場環境而言，尚不宜立即開放雙重股權結構之採用，但未來可朝向開放之目標邁進。
;With the changing and booming development of the modern technology and the rapid economic, the way of business shall be adjusted to be more flexible and open in order to maintain the competitiveness of the business. However, the traditional shareholder right is placed too much emphasis on the formal principle of shareholder equality, which is far too rigid and outdated under the current legal system . This paper argues that, under the principle of contractual freedom and the investor responsible for the actions themselves, the competent authorities should not unduly interfere with the equity trading design of the shareholders and the company, unless there’s detrimental to the public interest or significant impact to the interests of shareholders.
After the breakthrough of the rigid, traditional and formal principle of shareholder equality, the design of the equity can be different from the principle of “one share, one vote (OSOV)” , and such design is called “dual-class shares” structure. Dual-class shares structure is still a controversial system, so this paper introduces the origin, the development, the basic theory, the application, and the pros and cons of the system, to make the reader recognize the system and give the proper evaluation.
In regards to the evaluation of the adoption of dual-class shares structure of the operators of corporation, in Williams v. Geier case, it was not recognized as that the operators of corporation breach the fiduciary duty for violating the principle of “one share, one vote (OSOV)”,but was reviewed on the different aspects respectively. As for the issue that whether dual-class shares structure is beneficial to shareholders, it should take the economic interests, the interests of voting right, the quality of shareholders consent and judicial review into account by case. And the case of Google Inc. issuing Class C Shares (GOOG stock) is worth considering.
Also, this paper describes and analyzes Alibaba Partnership system as a reference for Taiwan to review the law. Finally, as a conclusion , there’s no sufficient legitimacy to prohibit the dual-class shares structures in theory, but it is still not suitable for Taiwan’s stock market in real to allow the adoption of dual-class shares structure. However, it may be a goal to open it in the future. |
