| 摘要: | 有別於過去的文獻使用代理理論的架構，本計畫使用家族企業社會情感財富的架構與理論，探討家族所 有權與財務報導的關聯性。本計畫聚焦於家族情感財富的兩個最重要構面:家族控制力與家族認同度，探討 其對財務報導決策的影響，本計畫所探討的財務報導決策包括盈餘管理，自願性揭露，會計師選擇與審計 公費。家族控制力與家族認同度是抽象的概念，本計畫將其量化並進行實證的分析。本計畫認為，較重視 家族控制力的控制股東，會使用控制力增強的機制增加其控制力。家族企業可分為原創家族與透過股權交 易獲控制權的的家族(稱為非原創家族)，原創家族對於家族企業較具認同度。 第一年的研究計畫探討家族控制力與認同度對盈餘管理的影響。本計畫認為，以控制力為導向的家族企 業較會透過盈餘管理鞏固其控制力與影響力，而應計項目的盈餘管理(而非實質盈餘管理)較易為外部投資人 所偵測進而削弱家族影響力，故本計畫預期，相較於非家族企業，以控制力為導向(具有控制力增強機制) 的家族企業較會操縱盈餘，操縱盈餘時，較會使用應計項目的盈餘管理。應計項目的盈餘管理較易為外界 偵測而破壞公司的名聲，因此，相較於非家族企業，以認同度為導向的家族企業(原創家族企業)，較不會進 行盈餘管理，如進行盈餘管理，也較會選擇不會破壞名聲的實質盈餘管理。 第二年的研究計畫探討家族控制力與認同度對自願性揭露的影響。自願性揭露會降低公司競爭力與控制 力。因此，相較於非家族企業，具有控制力增強機制的家族企業(以控制力為導向的家族企業)，較不願意進 行自願性揭露。自願性揭露可分為前瞻性與歷史性的揭露。前瞻性的揭露可鼓舞人心，增強公司控制。本 計畫預期，具有控制力增強機制之家族企業 (控制力為導向的家族企業)，較會進行前瞻性的自願性揭露。 自願性的揭露可以增加公司的名聲，重視名聲的公司進行自願性揭露，較會揭歷史性，具可信度的會計資 訊以維護其名聲。月盈餘的揭露被視為歷史性具有可信度的揭露。因此，本計畫預期，相較於非家族企業， 原創家族企業 (以認同度導向的家族企業)，較會進行自願性揭露。如果揭露，較會揭露歷史性可驗證的月 盈餘資訊。 第三年的研究計畫探討家族控制力與認同度對會計師選擇與審計公費的影響。由於高品質的會計師限制 了控制力導向的家族企業進行盈餘管理的能力，相較於非家族企業，沒有控制力增強機制的家族企業 (以控 制力為導向家族企業)較不會聘請高品質的會計師，在給定相同的會計師品質下，其審計公費較高。但是聘 請高品質的會計師有助於公司形象與名聲的提升，相較於非家族企業，原創家族企業 (以認同度為導向的家 族企業)較會聘請高品質的會計師。原創家族企業 (以認同度為導向的家族企業)具較低的訴訟風險與固有風 險，較不會進行盈餘管理，本計畫預期，相較於非家族企業，原創家族企業 (以認同度為導向的家族企業) 審計公費較低。 ;This three-year project seeks to go beyond the traditional agency perspective by employing the socioemotional wealth (SEW) framework to explain how the dimensions of ‘Family Control and Influence’ and ‘Family Identity’ dimensions affect financial reporting decisions (i.e., earnings management, voluntary disclosure, audit choices and audit fees) in family firms in Taiwan. These dimensions are used as a broad yet unitary explanatory construct within the SEW model without being measured directly. The study shows that the ‘Family Control and Influence’ dimension of SEW is more salient for family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms than for non-family firms, while the ‘Family Identity’ dimension is more salient to non-acquired family firms than to non-family firms. In the first year of the project, variations in family ownership configurations and the process by which families obtain ownership and how this affects earnings management in family firms are examined. This project expects that family firms with control mechanisms (control-focused family firms) are more likely to engage in earnings management, relative to non-family firms. Given that real earnings management is likely to lead outsider investors to challenge the prevailing position of the family, they are more likely to engage in accrual earnings management than real earnings management. In addition, relative to non-family firms, non-acquired family firms (identity-focused family firms) are less likely to engage in earnings management, and if they do so, they are more likely to engage in real earnings management than accrual earnings management so as to protect their reputation. In the second year of the project, variations in family ownership configurations and the process by which families obtain ownership of firms and how this affects voluntary disclosure among family firms, are examined. It is argued that voluntary disclosure will undermine family control and its competition. Thus, family firms with control mechanisms (control-focused family firms) are less likely to engage in voluntary disclosure relative to non-family firms and if they do so, they are more likely to engage in forward looking disclosure and host conference calls. It is argued that more voluntary disclosure would help identity-focused family firms to capture reputational gains. Disclosing unverifiable and less credible information will damage the good standing of identity-focused firms in the eyes of external stakeholders. Monthly earnings disclosures are perceived as being verifiable, credible and history voluntary disclosure. Thus, this it is predicted that non-acquired family firms (identity-focused family firms) are more likely to engage in voluntary disclosure relative to non-family firms, and that when they do so, they are more likely to voluntarily disclose monthly earnings. In the third year the project examines how variations in family ownership configurations and the process by which families have obtained the ownership of the firm will affect auditor choices and audit fees Because high-quality auditors limit the control-focused family firm’s ability to manipulate accounting information, it is argued that, relative to non-family firms, family firms with control enhancing mechanisms (control-focused family firms) are less likely to appoint high-quality auditors. Appointing high-quality auditors helps identity-focused family owners to satisfy their desire to preserve the family’s image and reputation in the market; therefore, non-acquired family firms (identity-focused family firms) are more likely to appoint high-quality auditors than non-family firms. I expect that family firms with control enhancing mechanisms (non-acquired family firms) incur more (lower) audit fees relative to non-family firms. |
