本文研究目的為探討獨立董事的政治連結、資本結構與公司績效之間的關係，以 2008年到 2016年股票市場的中國上市公司作為研究對象，取樣 11,294個觀察值，並將上市公司分為中央政府控制國有企業、地方政府控制國有企業以及非國有企業。本研究採用Panel data analysis 驗證假說。實證研究發現，國有企業引進獨立董事的政治連結對公司績效具有負面影響，而非國有企業引進獨立董事的政治連結對公司績效與資本結構皆具有正面影響，但無論國有企與非國有企業皆未發現資本結構對獨立董事的政治連結與公司績效的關係具有調節效果。;This study examines the relationship among political connection of independent directors, capital structure and corporate performance. Utilizing panel data analysis and a sample with 11,294 observations from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges of China for the period of 2008–2016, this study investigates whether this relationship is different among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the central government and those controlled by local governments as well as non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). The empirical results show that the political connection of independent directors in SOEs has a negative impact on corporate performance. However, this impact is positive for Non-SOEs. Furthermore, capital structure has no moderating effect on the relationship between political connection of independent directors and corporate performance for both SOEs and Non-SOEs.
