| 摘要: | 本論文旨在從奇正鎮（號蘆沙，1798～1879）、李恆老（華西，1792～1868）、李震相（號寒洲，1818～1886）及田愚（號艮齋、臼山、秋譚，1841~1922）四人的理論交峰，展示朝鮮後期性理學之面貌，並由中突顯朝鮮性理學在當代朱子學詮釋中的意義。
奇正鎮，李恒老、及李震相三人在思想上較靠近退溪學，而田愚則更靠近栗谷學。奇正鎮的思想主要表現在其對「理一分殊」論的理解、李恒老是在「明德主理」一主張、李震相是在「心即理」說的提出，而田愚則是「性師心弟」一理論。四人的理論皆可說明同一問題——在朱子學中，道德實踐是如何可能的？此亦即朱子學工夫論之問題。
對奇正鎮，李恒老、及李震相三人而言，他們主張性理是可直遂於心，直接主宰一切活動的。特別是李恒老及李震相，更是強調性理本來即存在於每個人生命中，只要挺立此心中之理、直接由心中之理出發而主宰生命活動，則自然能有道德行動之結果。這一說?法的特色，在於十分強調性理能直接在我們生命中發揮作用一義，也十分正面地肯定人是可直接由心中之理出發來主宰氣稟活動、實踐道德的，這一對朱子學的詮釋可說是將朱子「重視性理」的精神推擴到了另一高度；而在另一方面，艮齋則不認為性理可直接主導、命令氣稟活動，對他而言，性理對於氣稟只能有「不宰之宰、不使之使」義的主宰，並且，這一主宰的內涵能否發揮，與心是否能確實地以性理為標準來要求自己是有很大關係的。因此，艮齋十分重視心是否隨時能恭敬謙下地以性理為尊，省視自己的行為是否有違理，只有在心時時保持著對性理的敬畏，性理才有辦法真正落實在我們的生命，心才能如實地實踐道德。艮齋這種唯恐人不謙卑地作省視自己的工夫、以為自己自然作出的行動就可以是符合道理之精神，即，這種對於人只有在在兢畏，刻刻省厲才能實踐道德的體會，是要比上論三家要來得深刻的。
通過疏理蘆沙、華西、寒洲及艮齋的理論，我們可歸納「心說論爭」中有三個衝突點：（1）理是否有活動性之衝突；（2）是否積極地肯定「變化氣質」在成德工夫上的重要性之衝突；（3）在道德實踐上，心與理的關係應是「心以性理為體」，或應是「心與理截然為二」之衝突。透過探討朝鮮末期性理學者們的爭論，本論文希望除了展示朝鮮性理學在朱子學詮釋上的細緻度及豐富的哲學性之外，也希望能藉由這一辯論，為當代朱子學的討論提供另一思考的角度，由此而見朝鮮儒學在當代朱子學研究中的重要地位及此一論爭的意義。;By investigating the theoretical debates between Ki Jungjin(???，奇正鎮), Lee Hangro(???，李恆?), Lee Jin-sang(???，李震相) and Jeon woo(??，?愚), this thesis demonstrates the later period of Korean Neo-Confucianism and emphasizes its importance in the modern interpretation of Zhuism.
The theory of Ki Jungjin, Lee Hangro and Lee Jin-sang is related with the school of Toegye. However, the theory of Jeon woo is influenced by the school of Yulgok. Ki Jungjin concentrates on the interpretation of “li-yi-feng-shu”(理一分殊), Li Hwaseo claims “MingDeJuLi”(明德主理), while Li Han-Ju presents “Simjeukli”(心即理), and Jeon woo claims “soeng sa sim je”(性師?弟). All those theories focus on the same question: How is moral practice possible in Zhuism?
Ki-Jeongjin, Li Hwaseo and Li Han-Ju claim that by following Xin, Li actually guides all our behaviors. Li Hwaseo and Li Han-Ju even emphasize that Li exists in everyone’s mind, by obeying the request of Li, we can take moral action naturally. This interpretation re-emphasizes the idea of “Xing Li” in Zhuism. On the other hand, Jeon woo disagrees to the interpretations mentioned above. He claims that Li can not directly rule Qi, and whether Li can rule Qi or not depends on our mind (Xin) to follow Li. Therefore, he highlights the importance of Xin looking up to Li and follows Li reverently, which enables us to reflect all our behavior whether it is against the request of Li. Jeon woo believes this is the only way we can act morally. The argumentation of Jeon woo highlights the importance of self-reflection, which is crucial to moral practice.
By analysizing those theories above, this thesis concludes three debates in “Simseol argument”: (1) When we act, does Li “command” us, or does it just “inspire” us ? (2) Do they positively confirm the importance of the changing of Qi in moral practice? (3) In moral practice, is the existence of Xin based on Xing Li? Or these two actually work separately? By investigating those debates among the later period of Korean Neo-Confucianism, this thesis hopes to demonstrate the details and philosophical richness they have brought to the interpretation of Zhuism and provide another perspective for understanding modern Zhuism. Thus we can realize the importance of the later period of Korean Neo-confucianism in the modern Zhuism and the value of those debates. |
