什麼決定一個人的幸福——論個人幸福的基石;What Makes a Life Good for the Person who Lives It

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Title:	什麼決定一個人的幸福——論個人幸福的基石;What Makes a Life Good for the Person who Lives It
Authors:	李曉雲;Lee, Shiau-Yun
Contributors:	哲學研究所
Keywords:	價值;幸福;哲學幸福理論;價值形式;幸福元素;幸福基石;value;well-being;philosophical theories of well-being;value forms;the elements of well-being;the ground of well-being
Date:	2022-08-18
Issue Date:	2022-10-04 11:34:06 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本博士論文要探討的是幸福基石的問題，即：是什麼決定一個人的幸福？當代西方哲學界多年來提出了形形色色的哲學幸福理論來嘗試回答這個問題。然而，這些幸福理論都無法為這個問題提出有說服力的解答，這不是因為它們理論有各自的局限，而是它們共享一些習而不察卻有問題的理論預設。本文指出，這兩大解題預設：把幸福元素當作幸福的基石；以及把幸福元素當作內在價值，使得這些哲學幸福理論一直陷入辯論不休的僵局，也是它們被詬病為理論解釋不力、實踐指導不力的真正根源，因為被當作解題方案的內在價值並不能承擔幸福基石的重任。有鑒於前述的兩個解題預設既根深蒂固又弊病叢生，本文建議以非內在價值為研究進路的替代理論來取代以內在價值為研究重心的傳統哲學幸福理論。檢驗了學界最新的三大幸福替代理論之後，本文認為Alexandrova的中層理論應該被否決，而Tiberius的價值實現理論以及Bishop的幸福網絡理論則可以被保留和繼續發展。這兩個替代理論雖然優越於前述的傳統幸福理論，但是它們都沒有為價值的性質這個基本概念提出有系統性的論述，以致於他們的理論無法解釋背後的價值預設，也無法從中發展出幸福動態學。為此，本文提出一個新的哲學幸福理論，即連疊理論，除了為幸福基石的問題提供新的解題資源，也為前面的替代理論填補上價值性質這個失落的環節。連疊理論以資源思想架構為理論的基礎，將價值定位為「可促進生命目的的資源」，價值的性質也因此被界定為「可被資源化」。連疊理論將價值的結構區分為價值質料與價值形式，並根據這三個價值形式：時間形式、空間形式與鑲嵌形式推展出幸福基石的論述。根據幸福連疊理論，一個人是否過得幸福取決於他或她是否以連疊的鑲嵌形式實現那些價值時空形式是累積性和擴展性的幸福核心價值。除了解答幸福基石的問題，本文也根據價值的性質與形式發展幸福動態學的基本雛形，以此說明決定每個價值形式運作機理背後的關鍵訊息。 ;This doctoral dissertation is to address the question of the ground of well-being, that is the question of what makes a life good for the person who lives it (hereafter, W). Contemporary western philosophy has put forward various philosophical well-being theories to answer W, yet none of them so far successfully offers a convincing answer to it, despite the question has been discussed over decades. Not only that, the existing philosophical well-being theories are stuck in a stalemate of endless debate and are rejected by many scholars because of their inability in resolving the theoretical and practical issues of well-being. This dissertation tends to show that the problems of philosophical well-being theories are not caused by their theoretical flaws, instead, the source of their problems lies in the two hidden and deep-rooted presuppositions shared by all philosophical well-being theories. These two presuppositions, namely assuming the elements of well-being as the ground of well-being, and assuming the elements of well-being as the noninstrumental values, have directed the western philosophy of well-being to focus too much energy on noninstrumental values. Since noninstrumental values by their nature are unable to function as the ground of well-being, as a result, philosophical well-being theories fail to provide promising explanations and guidance to address ordinary as well as scientific well-being issues. It is thus concluded that the existing traditional philosophical well-being theories should be rejected and replaced by alternative theories which do not explore W via the noninstrumental values approach. After examining the latest three alternative theories of well-being, this dissertation argues that Alexandrova′s Middle Theory should be rejected, while Tiberius′ Value Fulfillment Theory and Bishop′s Network Theory should remain and further developed. Although these two accepted alternative theories are superior to the aforementioned traditional well-being theories, neither of them proposes a systematic account of the nature of value, nor do they develop an account of well-being dynamics in their theories as well, and these two components are considered crucial for providing a comprehensive answer to W. To fill in the gap, this dissertation proposes a new alternative philosophical well-being theory, namely Continuity and Accumulation Well-Being Theory (hereafter, CAT) which aims at providing a new approach to investigating W. CAT has not only developed a systematic account of the nature of value, it has also formulated the forms of value from which the ground and the dynamic of well-being could be further inferred and developed. According to CAT, values are defined as resources that contribute to personal well-being; and W is answered in this way: a person’s life is good for the person who lives it if and only if the person is continuously realizing and accumulating those well-being values, of which the value forms are cumulative over time and spatially extensive to other values.
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