本文探討氣候變遷與高階經理人薪酬績效設計之關聯性。透過美國各州之氣候變遷適應政策實行與否以及政策實行積極度差異，影響企業之氣候適應性與投資不確定性，觀察其對於CEO之薪酬績效指標影響。在樣本分析中我們發現，氣候變遷適應政策的制定與各州的政黨支持傾向以及產業發展息息相關；而實證結果則顯示了當該州有實行氣候變遷適應政策時，降低了投資不確定性，企業會增加CEO總薪酬績效指標計劃數，並且會較降低CEO非財報相關薪酬績效指標；而進一步則以氣候變遷適應政策實行積極度進行分析，當該州之氣候變遷適應政策實行積極度愈高時，結果除了如同先前發現公司會降低非財報相關薪酬績效指標計劃外，也發現到公司在增加財報相關薪酬績效指標計劃時，亦會增加盈餘相關績效指標比例。本研究之結果為政府政策、公司治理與薪酬訂定間的關聯發現到了另一種可能性。;This study examines the relationship between climate change and executive compensation design. By analyzing the implementation and intensity of climate change adaptation policies across different states in the United States and their impact on corporate climate adaptability and investment uncertainty, we observe their influence on CEO compensation performance metrics. In the sample analysis, we found that the formulation of climate change adaptation policies is closely related to the political inclination and industrial development of each state. Empirical results indicate that when a state implements climate change adaptation policies, it reduces investment uncertainty, leading companies to increase the number of CEO total compensation performance metrics and decrease CEO non-financial performance metrics. Furthermore, when analyzing the degree of implementation of climate change adaptation policies, higher intensity is associated with a decrease in non-financial performance metrics and an increase in financial performance metrics, particularly those related to earnings. The results of this research reveal an additional possibility in the relationship between government policies, corporate governance, and compensation practices.
