在低軌道（LEO）衛星上應用 FPGA 的可重構衛星，由於其效能及配置彈性優勢而被廣泛使用。為了確保可重構衛星任務的可靠性，遠程證實技術被用來確認運行中的系統狀態。然而，目前的 FPGA 遠端證實方法在衛星應用的場景下，面臨 IP 竊取和證實過程可靠性的問題。因此我們提出 TrustRAS，基於 ARM TrustZone 技術的可重構衛星之遠程證實系統，確保在軌道中衛星運行時的完整性以及提供安全的證實過程。同時，我們在系統中加入了遙測指令的認證功能，以防止惡意命令影響衛星的運作穩定性。最後，我們在 AMD Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC 開發板上實作 TrustRAS 並評估安全性及其時間開銷。;Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites are rapidly developing. The utilization of reconfigurable satellites has significantly increased due to the rapid execution and reconfigurability capabilities of FPGAs. To ensure the reliability of mission execution, remote attestation is a method that can verify the integrity of the system. However, existing FPGA remote attestation methods encounter challenges related to IP piracy and the reliability of attestation process in the satellite scenario. Moreover, the communication challenges between satellites and ground stations involve the transmission of malicious commands by unauthorized ground stations, and since the communication between satellites and ground stations is not always consistent, satellites are unable to receive remote attestation requests at all times. To overcome these issues, we propose TrustRAS, an ARM TrustZone-based remote attestation system for reconfigurable satellites. Our solution ensures the runtime bitstream integrity of the satellite on orbit while also guaranteeing the security of the attestation process. Additionally, we provide telecommand authentication for satellite communication to ensure that malicious commands will not affect the stability of the satellite. Finally, we perform a security analysis of TrustRAS, implement the system on the AMD Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC development board, and evaluate the performance overhead to confirm the system′s feasibility.
