摘要: | 本研究建構一個雙階段逆向供應鏈模型,由一位製造商與一位零售商組成。零售商提供激勵金並設立外觀品質門檻,以鼓勵消費者回收使用後產品,並僅轉售合格品項予製造商;製造商則依內部品質進行再製或淘汰處理。該流程涵蓋回收至再製的完整環節,並反映資訊不對稱與品質變異的實務挑戰。 考量品質資訊的不完全可觀測性,模型假設消費者心理預期、外觀品質與內部品質三者具相關性,並採用 Stackelberg 博弈架構,比較三種資訊可視性場景:基準型去中心化、中心化,以及導入區塊鏈與智能合約的協同機制。區塊鏈場景透過上鏈紀錄與條件補貼設計,強化誘因相容性與合作效率。 透過數值與敏感度分析,結果顯示區塊鏈模型可顯著提升回收量與系統利潤,並達成與集中決策相當之績效,確保雙方均能受益。此外,在面對資訊干擾與成本變動下,亦展現策略穩健性。 整體而言,本研究驗證區塊鏈結合智能合約具備改善資訊不對稱、提升回收績效與協同決策效率的潛力,並為企業導入永續回收與數位治理提供實務指引。 ;This study develops a two-stage reverse supply chain model composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. To encourage consumers to return used products, the retailer offers financial incentives and sets an external quality screening threshold, reselling only qualified items to the manufacturer. The manufacturer further inspects internal quality to determine whether to remanufacture or discard the returned products. This process captures the full cycle from consumer return to remanufacturing and reflects practical challenges such as information asymmetry and quality variability. To better reflect real-world decision-making, the model incorporates incomplete observability of quality attributes, assuming correlation among consumers’ return expectations, external quality, and internal quality. A Stackelberg game framework is adopted to analyze three scenarios of information visibility: baseline decentralized, centralized, and blockchain-enabled coordination. In the blockchain scenario, product information is recorded on-chain and conditional subsidy mechanisms are implemented via smart contracts to enhance incentive compatibility and coordination efficiency. Through numerical and sensitivity analysis, this study compares optimal decisions, profit allocation, and recovery performance across the three settings. Results show that the blockchain model significantly increases the volume of returns and overall system profit, achieving performance levels comparable to centralized coordination while ensuring mutual benefit for both supply chain members. Furthermore, the blockchain-based mechanism demonstrates strong robustness under various uncertainties, including information distortion and cost fluctuations. Overall, this study confirms that blockchain-integrated incentive design can effectively overcome information asymmetry, replicate centralized decision efficiency, and provide actionable strategies for implementing sustainable recovery systems and digital coordination in practice. |