季彭山龍惕工夫研究

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題名:	季彭山龍惕工夫研究
作者:	廖鈺婷;Liao, Yu-Ting
貢獻者:	中國文學系
關鍵詞:	季本;龍惕;心學;明代經學;戒懼
日期:	2025-08-21
上傳時間:	2025-10-17 11:09:58 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	本研究以明代王門儒者季本（字明德，號彭山，1485─1563）的學術實踐為切入點，檢視陽明心學中良知教義在面對氣質遮蔽與工夫空疏時的困境，並反思其與經學之間的張力。彭山出身陽明門下，著述宏富，兼通六經而重視工夫，與後學偏重直覺本體、忽略涵養的風氣迥異。他特別強調「謹獨」、「惕然」、「讀書」與「注經」，開展出一條由良知推動實踐、落實德性涵養的路徑。雖曾被批評為偏近朱子，或者不明師說，但實際上，他關懷的重點在於矯正王門流弊，使良知之體與氣質、問學能互為表裡。透過統整三者關係，他以「龍惕工夫」建構出一條由本體流行而貫通工夫與詮經的實踐之路，從而為良知教義注入新的發展方向。彭山之思想主軸，始終圍繞著一個核心問題：良知本自圓滿、不增不減，然人處於氣質情欲流行之中，若無持守，則易為所蔽而不顯。為此，他援引《易》乾卦九三爻辭「君子終日乾乾，夕惕若厲，無咎」，提出「龍惕說」，認為惕並非外加於良知之上的工夫，而是良知靈明在氣質流行中自然呈現的主宰作用。惕之發用，乃良知之光於境遇中自持不失。本工夫的目的，即在氣血情欲流行時，挺立大本以惕然常覺。如此，良知的道德動力即可不息地推動一切實踐，並引導氣血情欲中本有的善端，成其為德性實現的資糧。職是之故，彭山的工夫實踐，不僅在於「防失」，更在於「常顯」：於氣血情欲流行的當下，自覺良知內在剛健惕懼的道德動力，使其在動靜往來中恆常挺立。他的謹獨之功，特別強調良知在氣質初萌、幾之初動時必須惕然自覺，確保主宰不失，使道德本體能現於氣質之中。也因此，他並不將氣質情欲視為單純的蔽障，而認為其中亦蘊含善端，若在良知持守之下得以存養，便能轉化為德性發用的資糧。如此一來，「本體挺立」與「善端涵養」形成互為依憑的循環：良知的主宰使善端得以顯現，而善端的滋養又反過來提振良知惕然常覺之工夫，使德性動力綿密不斷，貫通於感物應事的歷程。隨著善端涵養的推進，本體惕然之覺得以持續挺立，展現德性工夫的循環，並由此形成「以知保行」的條理，為知行合一的開展奠定基礎。這種強調工夫持續歷程的立場，也體現在彭山對「格物致知」的詮釋之中。他認為「物」並非心外萬理，而是良知在境遇中所感之處，因此格物不是向外窮索，而是良知在氣質流行中持其主宰、涵養善端的工夫進路。致知之道，正在於惕然持守，使良知之光於事物感發時不為所奪，而能引領氣質善端不斷轉化為德性之資。由此，格物便不僅是知識的獲取，而是善端涵養與本體挺立相互循環的歷程：良知的主宰使感物不失條理，而善端的滋養又反過來提振良知的惕然常覺。正因如此，彭山進一步強調讀書問學亦當納入此循環之中——經典文字本為聖人良知所寓，讀書非但不礙致良知，反而能觸發良知、涵養善端，使格物與問學相互銜接，共同成為致良知的實踐路徑。也因此，彭山在不違背良知教「心學即經學」、六經為良知載體的脈絡下，進一步主張六經乃聖人良知之載籍，讀書不但不礙致良知，反而是良知在文字中觸發、涵養、再度惕然自覺的契機。他因而開展出一條以良知為經典詮釋之主體、起點與歸宿的理路，並將訓詁章句視為踐履致知誠意的實踐場域。經典之所以為經，不在於文字之真偽，而在於能否引發良知感通，並於德行履踐的歷程中維持惕然常覺，使實踐不失其節。是以，雖然後世批評其詮釋過度，但在他看來，注經不僅是文字之學，更是良知本體持續推動的德性工夫。故其經學著作，無論是對朱子之說的取捨，或對禮樂制度的探討，皆體現他以良知為詮釋根據，並將經典義理轉化為德性實踐的立場。由此可見，他視經典不僅為文本之學，更為心體之實踐。總括而言，彭山之學既非回流朱子，亦未曾背離良知教。他以良知為宗、經典為翼，嘗試建構一套兼顧內聖修持與外王施行的思想體系。其學術實踐不在於復述學案定評，而是在陽明學轉衰之際，為後學開闢一條可資積累、經世致用的實踐通路。此一路徑既具哲學深度，又含具體工夫方法，成為明代心學內部自我反省與轉化的重要環節。是以，雖然本文切入點聚焦於彭山一人一說，但實際的討論，亦進一步延伸至王門「本體與工夫如何貫通」的結構性議題；此一觀察不僅可作為檢視良知教理論與經典詮釋互動的切入點，亦為將讀書問學納入致良知工夫的實踐方法提供新的參照。 ;This study takes the scholarly praxis of Ji Ben (styled Mingde, sobriquet Pengshan, 1485–1563), a prominent disciple within the Wang school of Ming Confucianism, as its point of departure to examine the challenges faced by the doctrine of innate moral knowledge within Heart-Mind Philosophy, particularly the problems of obstruction by temperament and the tendency toward vacuous praxis. It further reflects on the tension between Heart-Mind Philosophy and Confucian Classical Studies in the Ming Dynasty. As a disciple of Wang Yangming, Ji Ben was prolific in his writings, thoroughly versed in the Six Classics and deeply committed to praxis. In contrast to later disciples of the Wang school, who inclined toward emphasizing intuitive ontology while neglecting cultivation, Pengshan consistently stressed “solitary vigilance” (jin-du), “Moral Vigilance” (ti-ran), reading, and classical commentary. In so doing, he developed a pathway whereby innate moral knowledge could be advanced into praxis and moral cultivation. Although some critics disparaged him as leaning toward Zhu Xi or as misunderstanding the master’s teaching, Ji Ben’s concern lay in rectifying the shortcomings of the Wang school, enabling innate knowledge, temperament, and learning to mutually reinforce one another. Through integrating these three dimensions, he constructed—under the banner of the Theory of the Dragon’s Vigilance—a path of moral practice that flows from the heart-mind’s innate activity and penetrates both praxis and scriptural interpretation, thereby injecting a new direction into the doctrine of innate moral knowledge. At the core of Pengshan’s thought lies a single question: innate knowledge is originally complete, neither increasing nor diminishing, but once situated within the flux of temperament and desires, how can it be preserved from concealment? To this end, he invoked the “Qian” hexagram, line three, of the Book of Changes: “The noble man toils all day, vigilant at dusk as if in danger, and thus without fault.” On this basis he proposed the Theory of the Dragon’s Vigilance, holding that vigilance is not an external effort imposed upon innate knowledge but rather the natural sovereign function of moral awareness as it courses through temperament. The activity of vigilance is none other than the radiance of innate knowledge maintaining itself unlost in circumstance. The aim of this praxis is, in the midst of desires and passions, to uphold the great foundation and remain morally vigilant. In this way, the moral vitality of innate knowledge may ceaselessly impel all action, guiding the latent moral sprouts within temperament to become resources for the realization of virtue. Accordingly, Pengshan’s praxis was concerned not only with “preventing loss” but more crucially with “constant manifestation.” In the midst of the flow of desires and emotions, one must be morally vigilant of the inner, resilient dynamism of innate knowledge, enabling it to remain firmly established through both activity and stillness. His practice of solitary vigilance especially emphasized that, at the incipient stirring of temperament—the “subtle arousal”—one must remain morally vigilant, ensuring the sovereignty of innate knowledge and thereby allowing moral reality to appear within temperament itself. Thus he did not treat desires merely as obstacles, but held that they also contain moral sprouts; under the guidance of innate knowledge, these may be nurtured and transformed into resources for the realization of virtue. In this way, “the uprightness of the innate ground” and “the cultivation of moral sprouts” form a mutually sustaining cycle: the sovereignty of innate knowledge brings forth sprouts of goodness, while the nurturing of these sprouts, in turn, reinforces the vigilance of innate knowledge. Through this circulation, moral vitality becomes continuous and unbroken, permeating engagement with affairs. As this cultivation advances, innate vigilance is ever sustained, displaying a cycle of moral praxis that establishes the principle of “preserving action through knowledge” (yi zhi bao xing), thereby laying the foundation for the unfolding of the unity of knowledge and action. This emphasis on a continuous process of praxis is likewise evident in Pengshan’s interpretation of “investigating things to extend knowledge.” He argued that “things” are not external principles beyond the mind, but rather the occasions apprehended by innate knowledge in lived circumstances. Thus, investigating things does not mean exhaustively seeking principles outside, but is rather the praxis of innate knowledge maintaining its sovereignty amidst the flow of temperament and nurturing the moral sprouts therein. The way of extending knowledge lies in vigilant preservation, ensuring that the light of innate knowledge, when stimulated by affairs, is not overshadowed but instead directs temperament’s sprouts of goodness to be transformed into moral resources. In this sense, the investigation of things is not merely the acquisition of knowledge, but a cyclical process in which the cultivation of sprouts and the uprightness of the innate ground mutually sustain one another: innate sovereignty orders one’s engagement with affairs, while the nurturing of sprouts in turn reinforces innate vigilance. Hence Pengshan further emphasized that reading and learning must also be incorporated into this cycle—since the classics embody the sages’ innate knowledge, reading not only does not hinder but in fact stimulates innate awareness, nurtures sprouts, and renews vigilance. In this way, the investigation of things and learning interlock, together forming a pathway of moral praxis. Consequently, within the framework of Heart-Mind Philosophy as “classical learning is mind-learning,” and the Six Classics as vessels of innate knowledge, Pengshan advanced the claim that the classics are the very repositories of the sages’ innate knowledge. Reading thus does not hinder innate moral awareness but becomes an opportunity for its stimulation, cultivation, and renewed vigilance. He thereby developed a hermeneutical path that takes innate knowledge as the subject, origin, and telos of classical interpretation, regarding philology and textual annotation as arenas for enacting sincerity and extending knowledge. For him, what makes a text a “classic” lies not in textual authenticity but in its capacity to awaken innate knowledge and sustain vigilance within the process of moral praxis, ensuring that practice does not lose its proper measure. Hence, though later critics charged him with overinterpretation, he himself regarded commentary not as mere textual scholarship but as an ongoing moral praxis driven by innate knowledge. His works, whether in accepting or rejecting Zhu Xi’s views or in examining ritual and music institutions, all reflect his grounding of interpretation in innate knowledge and his aim to transform classical doctrine into moral practice. Thus, he treated the classics not merely as texts, but as the very praxis of the heart-mind. In sum, Pengshan’s thought was neither a regression to Zhu Xi nor a departure from the doctrine of innate knowledge. Taking innate knowledge as its foundation and the classics as its wings, it sought to construct a system that balances inner moral cultivation with external political action. His scholarly praxis did not consist in reiterating fixed judgments of the learning records, but rather, at a moment when Heart-Mind Philosophy was in decline, opened for later students a pathway of accumulation and practical application. This trajectory, containing both philosophical depth and concrete methods of praxis, became a vital moment of self-reflection and transformation within Ming Confucianism. Accordingly, though this study focuses on the single figure and teaching of Ji Ben, it further extends to the broader structural issue within the Wang school of how “innate knowledge and praxis can be integrated.” Such an inquiry provides not only a perspective for examining the interaction between the doctrine of innate knowledge and classical hermeneutics, but also a fresh reference for incorporating learning and reading into the praxis of innate moral knowledge.
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