| 摘要: | 本研究從「公權力委託」視角，檢視我國《職業安全衛生法》下顧問機制的立法與實務運作。首先，指出自法規施行以來，政府在集中管制與企業自主管理之間存在張力，法條第36條雖授權中央及勞檢機構於特定情況下得通知事業單位停工，並得請認可之顧問服務機構提供技術輔導，卻未明訂顧問受託行使之具體公權力範圍，使實務操作中「委託私人行使公權力」之意圖與現實落差懸而未決。
本研究採用代理理論、管家理論與歷史制度論三種理論視角，並透過文獻分析與主管機關、顧問機構及事業單位之深度訪談，勾勒顧問機制在制度演進中的關鍵轉折與利益權衡。研究發現：其一，法律雖具體規範中央主管機關可認可「顧問服務機構」，但缺乏明確的授權條文及監督獎懲機制，使顧問多半僅扮演「應付檢查」之技術輔助角色，未能真正取得或行使公權力；其二，代理理論顯示，在缺乏信任與對齊利害時，顧問易淪為工具性契約，僅求合規；管家理論則指出，若建立利害一致與資訊共享機制，顧問可成為長期合作夥伴，共同推動安全文化；其三，歷史制度論分析顯示，從早期「重罰與頻查」的監管模式，到引入顧問機制，顧問始終被定位為輔助性政策工具，未能突破制度依賴，形成推動實質改制的障礙。
基於上述發現，本研究建議：首先，應修訂《職業安全衛生法》，明確納入顧問（如工安或衛生技師）之法定職責與授權範圍，賦予其在特定情境下可行使之監督或檢查權限，並規範認可程序、資格標準及定期考評機制；其次，主管機關應開放與具市場性之專業技師公會及顧問事務所合作，突破過去侷限於非營利組織的慣例，建立多元公私夥伴關係，以加強資訊流動與利益共享；最後，應在立法與執行過程中廣納學者、產業界與勞方意見，透過協商機制，營造顧問與政府、事業單位三方信任基礎，並設計合理的獎懲與激勵措施，以推動職安衛制度從「應付檢查」走向「預防創新」之長期轉型。此舉有助於在既有路徑依賴下突破制度僵局，並為未來我國顧問機制的深化與可持續發展奠定法理與實務基礎。
;This research examines the legislative and practical operations of the consulting mechanism under the ROC’s Occupational Safety and Health Act from the perspective of delegation of public authority. First, it observes that since the Act’s enactment, the government has faced tension between centralized regulation and enterprises’ self-management. Although Article 36 authorizes central and labor inspection agencies to order a workplace to suspend operations under certain circumstances and to engage “consulting service institutions” approved by the central authority to provide technical guidance, it does not specify the exact scope of public-authority powers that may be delegated to consultants. As a result, the intent to “entrust private entities with public authority” remains unresolved in practice.
This research adopts Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, and Historical Institutionalism as its analytical lenses. Through literature analysis and in-depth interviews with relevant agencies, consulting firms, and enterprises, it traces key inflection points and competing interests in the evolution of the consulting mechanism. The findings are threefold:Although the law explicitly empowers the central authority to approve “consulting service institutions,” it lacks clear authorization clauses and oversight and sanction mechanisms. Consequently, consultants mostly serve as technical assistants who help enterprises comply with regulatory inspections, rather than genuinely exercising delegated public authority.From the Agency Theory perspective, when trust is lacking and interests are not aligned, consultants tend to behave as mere contractors focused on minimal compliance. In contrast, Stewardship Theory suggests that if shared interests and information-sharing mechanisms are established, consultants can become long-term partners who jointly promote a safety culture.
A Historical Institutionalism analysis shows that, from an early regulatory model centered on strict penalties and frequent inspections to the later introduction of consulting, consultants have consistently been positioned as auxiliary policy instruments. This positioning has failed to overcome institutional path dependency and has hindered substantive reform.Based on these findings, this research recommends:Amending the Occupational Safety and Health Act to explicitly define the statutory duties and authorization scope of consultants (such as safety or health engineers), granting them specific inspection or oversight powers in certain situations, and establishing clear procedures, qualification standards, and periodic evaluation mechanisms for their accreditation.Encouraging collaboration with market-oriented professional engineer associations and consulting firms—rather than limiting cooperation to non-profit organizations—so as to forge diverse public–private partnerships that enhance information flow and shared interests.During the legislative and implementation processes, soliciting broad input from scholars, industry representatives, and labor groups through consultative mechanisms to foster a foundation of trust among consultants, government authorities, and enterprises. Additionally, designing appropriate reward and sanction systems can help transition the occupational safety and health regime from merely “passing inspections” toward “preventive innovation.”Such measures will help break institutional stalemates rooted in existing path dependencies and lay a solid legal and practical foundation for deepening and sustaining the ROC’s consulting mechanism in the future. |
