藐視國會處罰之研究;A Study on Contempt of Congress Penalties

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Title:	藐視國會處罰之研究;A Study on Contempt of Congress Penalties
Authors:	柯緯勛;Ko, Wei-Hsun
Contributors:	法律與政府研究所
Keywords:	藐視國會;國會調查權;立法院職權行使法;權力分立;113年憲判字第 9 號判決;Contempt of Congress;Congressional investigative power;Legislative Yuan Exercise of Powers Act;separation of powers;113th Constitutional Judgment No. 9
Date:	2025-08-12
Issue Date:	2025-10-17 11:52:08 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本文探討「藐視國會處罰」之立法基礎與憲法正當性，因立法院調查權在實務上缺乏強制力，面臨被調查對象拒絕出席、拒絕提供資料或虛偽陳述等問題，致使監督功能無法發揮。本文首先說明國會調查權作為監督行政機關的重要工具，在權力分立下具有輔助性質，並指出缺乏具體、可執行之懲處機制將削弱國會問責。接著比較英、德、法、美、日等國藐視國會處罰之構成要件、處罰方式與程序保障，歸納其制度特色與成效。然後，以我國大法官解釋與憲判字為基礎，檢視我國現行法制中關於藐視國會處罰之條文，最新憲判字認為若由國會自行裁處刑罰，恐違反權力分立及法律明確性原則，而被提名人和公務員拒絕配合國會調查僅負政治責任，應透過民主問責機制追究。最後，提出具體建議：一是明確界定得在調查和聽證時行使強制力之主體；二是將區分行政罰與刑罰的處罰流程，以保障程序正義；三是採分級制裁機制，區分公務員以一般民眾的責任。期望透過此一制度設計，既能強化立法院調查權之有效性，亦可兼顧人民與被調查者之權利保障，實現民主監督與法治維護。 ;This article explores the legislative basis and constitutional legitimacy of the crime of "contempt of Congress penalties". In practice, the Legislative Yuan′s investigative power lacks coercive force and faces problems such as the subjects of investigation refusing to attend, refusing to provide information, or making false statements, which makes it impossible to perform its supervisory function. This article first explains that congressional investigative power, as a crucial tool for overseeing the executive branch, plays a supporting role within the separation of powers. It also argues that the lack of a specific,enforceable disciplinary mechanism weakens congressional accountability.It then compares the elements, methods, and procedural safeguards for contempt of Congress penalties in the United Kingdom, Germany, France,the United States, and Japan, summarizing their institutional characteristics and effectiveness. Then, based on the interpretation of our Chief Justice and constitutional rulings, we reviewed the provisions in our current legal system regarding penalties for contempt of Congress. The latest constitutional ruling believes that if Congress were to impose penalties on its own, it would violate the principles of separation of powers and legal clarity. Nominees and civil servants who refuse to cooperate with congressional investigations only bear political responsibility and should be held accountable through democratic accountability mechanisms. Finally, specific suggestions are put forward: first, clearly define the subject who can exercise coercive power during investigations and hearings; second, distinguish the punishment process of administrative penalties from criminal penalties to ensure procedural justice; third, adopt a graded sanction mechanism to distinguish the responsibilities of civil servants from those of ordinary citizens. It is hoped that through this system design, the effectiveness of the Legislative Yuan′s investigative power can be strengthened, and the rights of the people and those under investigation can be protected, so as to achieve democratic supervision and the maintenance of the rule of law.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Law and Government] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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