| 摘要: | 摘 要
在全球經濟環境瞬息萬變、產業競爭日益激烈的情況下，企業若欲迅速壯大規模、強化競爭優勢，單靠內部成長已經難以應對市場變化的速度。因此，併購（Mergers and Acquisitions, M&A）可以說是成為企業實現外部擴張與策略轉型的關鍵手段。透過併購的方式，企業不僅能夠於短時間內擴大市場佔有率、取得關鍵技術、專利權、核心技術人才或機器設備與資產，亦可進一步整合上下游資源，實現資源整合與成本效益。此外，在面對國際化布局與資源競爭的壓力下，跨國併購也成為企業拓展全球版圖的重要策略。因此，併購已不再僅是企業成長的選項之一，而是高度競爭環境下，企業追求規模經濟、技術整合與市場主導地位的最佳捷徑。
研究結果顯示，主併公司的董事治理績效對併購後的企業表現具有顯著影響，其中，在併購事件日該年度之董事會出席率與董事持股比例與併購前後Tobins Q的變動率呈顯著負相關。此現象可能反映市場投資人認為，併購案中潛藏某些問題，導致董事會需頻繁召開會議進行討論與決策，再加上董事持股過高亦可能導致董事們更關注個人或利益，而非全體股東的整體利益進而產生代理問題。這種情況下，董事可能推動不符合公司長期價值的併購決策，董事持股過高可能因利益衝突、過度自信、控制權固守、外部監督不足及資源分配不當等，而忽略併購的實際效益或風險，綜上理由，因而被解讀為企業面臨挑戰的訊號，而非治理優良的象徵。因此，本研究支持假說，即上市/上櫃主併公司的董事治理與併購後績效存在顯著關聯性。
關鍵字：董事治理、併購績效
;Abstract
In a rapidly changing global economic environment and increasingly intense industrial competition, relying solely on internal growth is insufficient for enterprises to keep pace with market dynamics if they aim to rapidly scale up and strengthen their competitive advantages. Consequently, Mergers and Acquisitions （M&A） have become a critical strategy for achieving external expansion and strategic transformation. Through M&A, enterprises can swiftly expand market share, acquire key technologies, patents, core technical talent, machinery, equipment, or assets, and further integrate upstream and downstream resources to achieve resource consolidation and cost efficiencies. Moreover, under the pressures of internationalization and resource competition, cross-border M&A has emerged as a vital strategy for companies to expand their global presence. Thus, M&A is no longer merely one option for corporate growth but the optimal pathway for enterprises to pursue economies of scale, technological integration, and market dominance in a highly competitive environment.
Research findings indicate that the governance performance of the acquiring company’s board significantly impacts post-merger corporate performance. Specifically, the board meeting attendance rate and the proportion of shares held by directors in the year of the merger event are significantly negatively correlated with the change rate of Tobin’s Q before and after the merger. This phenomenon may reflect market investors’ perceptions that certain issues are embedded in the merger, necessitating frequent board meetings for discussion and decision-making. Additionally, excessively high director shareholding may lead directors to prioritize personal or vested interests over the collective interests of all shareholders, thereby creating agency problems. In such cases, directors may push for merger decisions that do not align with the company’s long-term value. High director shareholding could result in negative impacts due to conflicts of interest, overconfidence, entrenchment of control, insufficient external oversight, and improper resource allocation, thereby overlooking the actual benefits or risks of the merger. Collectively, these factors are interpreted as signals of corporate challenges rather than indicators of robust governance. Therefore, this study supports the hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between the board governance of listed acquiring companies and post-merger performance.
Keywords: Board governance, M&A performance |
