| 摘要: | The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and veryeasily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.
— Adam Smith (1776)
250 年後的今日，古典經濟學者 Ada Smith 對「公司經營者」的論述，仍精闢地貫穿當今公司治理的核心要素。英國於19世紀頒布二項重大法案，1844年《合股公司法》及1855年《有限責任法》，賦予公司的法律定位，意味著「有限則責任公司」具備法人格得進行股份買賣與對外併購。
1930 年代「Berle–Dodd Debate」論證演變，反應了公司治理的核心問題：公司的目的應該是什麼 ? 公司所有權與經營權如何相互監管? 以及公司利益歸屬權應以何者為優先? 1990 年代以來，隨著經營醜聞軌跡擴展其廣度與深度，公司治理涉及層面可謂多元與結構網絡化。21世紀，各國公司治理呈現趨同發展（Convergence Movement）。大多數證券交易所對於上市公司頒布相關的公司治理準則。在臺灣，金管會公布「2013 強化我國公司治理藍圖」，內容包含對上市櫃公司辦理「公司治理評鑑」，協助外部投資機構法人單位及企業自身瞭解公司治理績效。本文以「公司治理績效」為題，採用實證研究，以「TWSE公司治理評鑑」作為「公司治理績效」的實證替代變數，試圖呈現那些關鍵「治理因子」顯著影響著「公司治理績效」，研究期間為2021年至2023年連續三年。共採用四個子模型：資訊揭露、公司結構、財務績效與公司特徵，嗣再整合成公司治理主模型，兼具時間及產業固定控制進行實證分析。
實證模型發現，「 資訊揭露透明度品質、法人持股比例、專業治理模式下董事會規模、經理人持股比例、短期財務績效(股東權益)、中期財務績效(負債比等)、財報由四大會計事務所簽證、董事兼任總經理、公司規模(資本額) 與上市櫃年齡」治理因子與「公司治理評鑑評比」具顯著性，揭示普遍認可的公司治理理論亦適用在臺灣上市櫃公司；另方面，實證模型更重要的發現一系列「反直覺」顯著性，「 CSR自願性揭露、CSR由四大會計事務所確信、本國金融機構持股比例、總資產成長率、研究發展費、公司營收、短期財務績效(每股盈餘)」因子，這些「反直覺」因子，挑戰了理論預期並可能揭示臺灣市場在公司治理中的獨特或複雜性。
為觀察產業別具有的產業內齊質性與產業外異質性，將「產業」做為控制變數。實證模型發現，治理因子的顯著相關性，產生「顯著消失與相關性轉變」的變異，將此變異區分為穩定與變動屬性。「穩定」治理因子對公司治理評鑑的影響力，不因產業差異仍普遍影響於臺灣上市櫃公司，該因子如表5-3所示：資訊揭露品質、法人持股比例、總資產、董事長兼經理等；另外，「變動」治理因子表示因子效應是基於產業異質性導致，其因子影響力並非普遍存在全產業中，該因子如表5-4所示： CSR四大事務所確信、每股盈餘、董會規模、本國金融機構持股比例等。
臺灣公司治理發展繼《公司治理3.0-永續發展藍圖》後，2023年嗣發布《上市櫃公司永續發展行動方案》，目的在於建構永續揭露準則，使資訊揭露朝透明制度化方向前進。後續對公司治理評鑑主題研究的者，應參酌當前相關機構推動主軸，咺兼具治理績效與經營績效的公司治理架構，進而提升企業於國際市場上的競爭力，方才是政府推動公司治理運動的核心目的。
;The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and veryeasily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.
— Adam Smith (1776)
Even 250 years later, Adam Smith′s discourse on Company Manager continues to penetrate the core elements of corporate governance. In 19th century, British enacted two pivotal statutes: the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited Liability Act of 1855. These acts granted legal status to companies, establishing “limited liability companies” as legal entities capable of share trading and external mergers and acquisitions.
By the 1930s, “Berle–Dodd Debate”emerged, bringing to the forefront fundamental questions at heart of corporate governance: 1) What should be the purpose of a company? 2) How should corporate ownership and control be regulated? 3) Whose interests should take precedence within the company? In the 21st century, corporate governance has converged globally, leading most stock exchanges to issue guidelines. Taiwan′s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) followed suit with its “2013 Blueprint for Strengthening Corporate Governance,” introducing a Corporate Governance Evaluation for listed and OTC companies.
This paper empirically examines "Corporate Governance Performance” using " Corporate Governance Evaluation” as dummy variable and aims to identify key “corporate governance factors” that significantly impact this performance. The empirical analysis identified several significant factors impacting corporate governance performance:
1. Transparency and Oversight: Quality of Information Disclosure, Financial Reports Audited by Big Four, Chairman Serving as General Manager.
2. Ownership Structure: Institutional Shareholding Ratio, Managerial Shareholding Ratio.
3. Financial Performance: Short-term (Shareholders′ Equity), Mid-term (Debt Ratio, etc.).
4. Company Characteristics: Board Size under Professional Governance, Company Size (Capital), Years since Listing/OTC Registration.
More notably, it also uncovered a series of “counter-intuitive” significant factors. These factors challenge theoretical expectations and may highlight unique aspects of the Taiwanese market′s corporate governance landscape:
5. Counter-Intuitive : Voluntary CSR Disclosure, CSR Assured by Big Four Accounting Firms, Domestic Financial Institutions′ Shareholding Ratio, Total Asset Growth Rate, Company Revenue, Research and Development Expenses, Earnings Per Share - counter-intuitive
Meanwhile, we included “Industry” as a control variable to address intra-industry variations. It revealed that accounting for industry altered the relationships and correlations among governance factors. Factors were classified into:
1. Governance Stable Factors: Information Disclosure Quality, Institutional Shareholding Ratio, Total Assets, and Chairman Also Serving as General Manager.
2. Governance Variable Factors: CSR Assured by Big Four Accounting Firms, Earnings Per Share, Board Size, and Domestic Financial Institutions′ Shareholding Ratio.
Following “Corporate Governance 3.0 - Sustainable Development Blueprint,” Taiwan further advanced corporate governance initiatives in 2023 with the release of “Action Plan for Sustainable Development of Listed and OTC Companies.” Primary goal of this plan is to establish sustainable disclosure standards, moving information transparency towards a more formalized system.
Future corporate governance research in Taiwan must consider diverse variables and industry background to build a framework that improves both governance and operational performance, thus enhancing international competitiveness—a key government objective. |
