中大學術數位典藏-NCU Institutional Repository-提供博碩士論文、考古題、期刊論文、研究計畫等下載:Item 987654321/99640
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 94201/94201 (100%)
Visitors : 81550656      Online Users : 3741
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/99640


    Title: Adjustments in managerial ownership and changes in firm value
    Authors: 陳明園;Chen, Ming-Yuan
    Contributors: 管理學院人力資源管理研究所
    Keywords: Business ownership;Economic models;Firm value;Managerial ownership;Managers;Market value;Ownership adjustments;Securities markets;Studies
    Date: 2013-01-01
    Issue Date: 2026-04-21 13:24:45 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Elsevier Inc.;Greenwich: Elsevier Inc
    Abstract: 摘要: This paper investigates the relation between adjustments in managerial ownership and changes in firm value from two perspectives. First, we examine whether moving toward the optimal level is an important concern for managers when they adjust their ownership. Second, we analyze the effect of changes in managerial ownership on changes in Tobin's q by focusing on how the market reacts differently between the adjustments toward optimal ownership and other discretionary adjustments. Using panel data of non-financial companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, we find evidence to show that managers significantly increase their ownership when there are below-optimal deviations, whereas reductions in ownership for above-optimal deviations are not significant. Empirical results also show that the market reacts positively to changes in ownership for removing deviations on either side of the optimal level. Discretionary increases or decreases in managerial ownership are detrimental to firm value. Our findings are robust to using different measures of changes in managerial ownership and to certain modifications in the empirical model. ► Managerial ownership adjusts asymmetrically from either side of the optimal level. ► Ownership adjustments removing deviations from the optimal level raise firm value. ► Discretionary increases or decreases in ownership lower firm value. ► Our findings are robust to using different measures of ownership adjustments.
    出版者: Greenwich: Elsevier Inc
    出版日期: 2013-01
    出處: International review of economics & finance, 2013-01, Vol.25, p.1-12
    資源來源: Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
    版權: 2012 Elsevier Inc.
    版權: Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Jan 2013
    識別號: ISSN: 1059-0560
    識別號: EISSN: 1873-8036
    識別號: DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2012.04.008
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Human Resource Management ] journal & Dissertation

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML22View/Open


    All items in NCUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明