DSpace community: 會計研究所

銷管費用僵固性、帝國建立動機與公司治理個別機制之成效

Thu, 23 Apr 2026 05:00:15 GMT

title: 銷管費用僵固性、帝國建立動機與公司治理個別機制之成效 abstract: 摘要：本研究以2005年至2012年台灣上市櫃公司的公司年資料為樣本驗證Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012)帝國建立動機是銷管費用僵固性成因之發現，並進一步探討公司治理個別機制是哪些帝國建立動機所造成僵固性的抑制對策。本研究發現以自由現金流量、總經理任期、總經理離職前、與總經理變動薪酬比率四個變數衡量的帝國建立動機，都會造成銷管費用僵固性。本研究也發現，法人持股比率越高、董事會規模越小、獨立董事比率越大、與總經理兼任董事長，各分別越能抑制一至三項帝國建立動機造成之僵固性，而且台灣公司治理個別機制的整體設計有「所有帝國建立動機所造成的僵固性都能抑制」與「每一個別機制都是有效的，且不會負向增強僵固性」的良好特質。出版者：台灣: 財團法人台北市淡江會計教育基金會出版日期： 2016-11-01 出處：當代會計, 2016-11, Vol.17 (2), p.131-171 資源來源：華藝線上圖書館識別號： ISSN: 1609-3895 識別號： DOI: 10.6675/JCA.17.2.01

Venture capital, corporate governance, and financial stability of IPO firms

Thu, 23 Apr 2026 05:00:01 GMT

title: Venture capital, corporate governance, and financial stability of IPO firms abstract: 摘要： This study investigates the effects of venture capital investments on corporate governance and financial stability of IPO-firms in the emerging markets. We find that VC-backed firms have less agency problems related to excess control than non-VC-backed firms at the time of IPO, and venture capitalists are more likely to improve the excess control problem in firms with weak-governance-structure than those with strong-governance-structure. We also find that VC-backed firms are less likely to encounter financial difficulty than non-VC-backed firms. Taken together, VC investments play a role in mitigating excess control and providing positive financial stability in the emerging markets. 出版者： Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V 出版日期： 2014-03-01 出處： Emerging markets review, 2014-03, Vol.18, p.19-33 版權： 2013 Elsevier B.V. 版權： Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 識別號： ISSN: 1566-0141 識別號： EISSN: 1873-6173 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2013.11.002

Trading behavior and stock returns in Japan

Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:59:26 GMT

title: Trading behavior and stock returns in Japan abstract: 摘要： •Institutional investors net buy growth stocks and net sell value stocks.•Individual investors net buy small/value stocks, and net sell large/growth stocks.•Institutional trading information improves the value strategy.•Investors’ trading behavior is weak in explaining value and size premiums in Japan. By using comprehensive firm-level dataset which includes all investors’ holdings in Japan, we show that institutional investors tend to net buy growth stocks and net sell value stocks. Conversely, individual investors tend to net buy small and value stocks, and net sell large and growth stocks. There is a significantly negative relation between annual changes in institutional ownership and future stocks returns. From an investment perspective, incorporating institutional trading information can significantly improve the value strategy. 出版者： Greenwich: Elsevier Inc 出版日期： 2015-11-01 出處： The Quarterly review of economics and finance, 2015-11, Vol.58, p.200-212 版權： 2015 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 版權： Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Nov 2015 識別號： ISSN: 1062-9769 識別號： EISSN: 1878-4259 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2015.03.004

The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

Thu, 23 Apr 2026 04:59:06 GMT

title: The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets abstract: 摘要： This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets. 出版者： Melbourne, Australia: Blackwell Publishing Asia 出版日期： 2012-03 出處： Abacus, 2012-03, Vol.48 (1), p.86-103 資源來源： EBSCOhost Business Source Premier 版權： 2012 The Authors. © 2012 Accounting Foundation, The University of Sydney 版權： Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Mar 2012 識別號： ISSN: 0001-3072 識別號： EISSN: 1467-6281 識別號： DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2012.00358.x 識別號： CODEN: ABACAF