https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/384 Search the Channel s https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/simple-search https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51667 title: The impact of inspection errors, imperfect maintenance and minimal repairs on an imperfect production system abstract: This paper develops an integrated model of production lot-sizing, maintenance and quality for considering the possibilities of inspection errors, preventive maintenance (PM) errors and minimal repairs for an imperfect production system with increasing hazard rates. In this study, a PM activity is imperfect in that a production system cannot be recovered as good as new and might cause the production system to shift to the out-of-control state with a certain probability. Numerical analyses are used to simulate the effect of changes in various parameters on the optimal solution for which the time that the process remains in the in-control state is assumed to follow a Weibull distribution. In addition, we investigate the effects of inspection errors and PM errors on the minimum total cost of the optimal inspection interval, inspection frequency and production quantity. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. <br> Tue, 27 Mar 2012 11:02:12 GMT https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51666 title: On channel coordination under price-dependent revenue-sharing: can eBay's fee structure coordinate the channel? abstract: This article deals with the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under consignment contracts with a price-dependent revenue-sharing (R-S) function. We consider the retailer being a channel leader who offers the vendor a leave-it-or-take-it contract, and the vendor being a price-setting firm who sells the one-of-a-kind goods through the exclusive channel. Under such a setting, the retailer decides on the term of R-S contract, and the vendor determines the retail price of the product. For each item sold, the retailer deducts an agreed-upon percentage from the price and remits the balance to the vendor. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game, and carry out equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel with consideration of three kinds of contracts: the fixed, the price-increasing, and the price-decreasing R-S percentage. Our analysis reveals that the contract with a price-decreasing R-S function, for example, the fee structure adopted by eBay.com, performs worse than the others. It persists in a consistent bias: the price-decreasing R-S induces the vendor to choose a higher price, and the retailer tends to receive a lower R-S percentage, which leads to less demand quantity, less profit, and channel inefficiency. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1992-2001. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.174 Published online 15 December 2010 <br> Tue, 27 Mar 2012 11:02:10 GMT https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51665 title: On channel coordination through revenue-sharing contracts with price and shelf-space dependent demand abstract: This paper deals with the problem of coordinating a vertically separated channel under a consignment contract with revenue sharing. We consider the demand of the downstream player, e.g., the retailer, being price and shelf-space sensitive. Under such a setting, the retailer decides on the revenue-sharing percentage and the slotting fee. And the upstream player, e.g., the manufacturer, decides on the retail price and the size of shelf-space. For each item sold, the retailer deducts an agreed-upon percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the manufacturer. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game, and carry out equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel, with and without cooperation. In addition, a profit sharing scheme through a two-part slotting allowance is proposed, which leads to Pareto improvements among channel participants. Our analysis reveals that the noncooperative game tends to set a higher revenue-sharing percentage and lower slotting fee by the retailer, and a higher retail price and less display space by the manufacturer, which leads to a lower channel profit. The consistent bias can be perfectly rectified by the cooperative game through the proposed two-part contractual agreement. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. <br> Tue, 27 Mar 2012 11:02:08 GMT https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51664 title: Fuzzy analytical hierarchy process and multi-segment goal programming applied to new product segmented under price strategy abstract: New product development (NPD) is becoming an important competitive advantage in the marketing strategies of current businesses. Developing a new product will incur fixed and variable costs, which then determine the product prices. Although this is a fundamental issue of marketing theory and practice, only a few papers on marketing models deal with price levels. The objective of this paper is proposing a model based on fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and multi-segment goal programming (MSGP) to help decision makers to select the best pricing strategy for NPD. A case study of NPD under market selection strategy in multiple segment pricing levels for a Taiwan-based Watch Company is presented to illustrate the proposed methodology. The proposed method will guide the product development team to select the best market strategy by taking into account the price level and product/market segmentation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. <br> Tue, 27 Mar 2012 11:02:06 GMT