DSpace collection: 博碩士論文

「此在」的存有論真理 / 以海德格的《存有與時間》為線索

Fri, 06 Mar 2026 10:37:47 GMT

title: 「此在」的存有論真理 / 以海德格的《存有與時間》為線索 abstract: 本論文試圖以海德格的《存有與時間》為線索來探討人類個體，亦即「此在（Dasein）」的存有以及原初真理作為「揭蔽（Unconcealment）」之關聯。在海德格看來，傳統的真理理論侷限在了認識論的範圍，亦即真理的所在是陳述語句。只有當陳述與其所描述之事實相符應，真理才可以被獲得。然而海德格認為，原初的真理意義必須回到古希臘的「Aletheia」一詞：亦即事物從其隱蔽中揭示出來，讓我們發現。而此真理必須以存有論的意義來理解。因為原初的真理現象是屬於「此在」的存有狀態。真理並非僅存在於陳述與事實相符應，而是在於「此在」對於事物、世界、以及自身存有之開顯或揭示。陳述對於事實的指示僅是「此在」存有作為「開顯性（disclosedness）」的一種衍生樣態。就此而言，海德格所謂的原初真理並不是對於傳統真理理論的反對，或是建構新的真理理論作為取代，而是探問真理理論之所以可能的基礎。本論文區分為五個章節。第一章為本論文的導論。第二章說明海德格的哲學立場以及他對存有論現象學的定義。隨後是對「此在」存有論之分析，解釋「此在」如何開顯世界、事物、以及自身的存有。第四章統整「此在」存有的整體結構，分析海德格所謂的原初真理意義作為「揭蔽」，並討論「此在」與真理之關係。最後是本論文的總結以及研究展望。 ;This paper attempts to explore the relationship between the Being of human individuals, namely "Dasein," and primordial truth as "Unconcealment" (Aletheia), taking Heidegger′s Being and Time as its guiding thread. In Heidegger′s view, traditional theories of truth are confined to the epistemological domain, where the “locus of truth” is the assertion or proposition. Truth can only be obtained when an assertion corresponds to the facts it describes. However, Heidegger argues that the primordial meaning of truth must return to the ancient Greek term "Aletheia": that is, things are revealed from their hiddenness and allowed to be discovered by us. This truth must be understood in an ontological sense, because the primordial phenomenon of truth belongs to Dasein’s state of Being. Truth does not merely exist in the correspondence between assertion and facts, but rather in Dasein′s disclosure or revelation of entities, the world, and its own Being. The indication of facts by assertions is merely a derivative mode of Dasein′s Being as "disclosedness." In this regard, what Heidegger means by primordial truth is not an opposition to traditional theories of truth, nor is it the construction of a new theory of truth as a replacement; rather, it is an inquiry into the foundation that makes theories of truth possible. This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is introduction. In chapter two, we will explicate Heidegger’s philosophical position and his definition of phenomenology. The third chapter is the analysis of Dasein, elucidating how Dasein discloses the world, entities, and its Being. Chapter four discusses about the structure of Dasein’s Being as a whole, then examines Heidegger’s conception of primordial truth as “unconcealment”, and explores the relationship between Dasein and truth. The final chapter of this paper are the conclusion and some research prospects.

以工夫之進路衡定張載的義理系統兼評氣學之說;Clarification and Establishing Zhang Zai’s Philosophy by The Approach of Moral Cultivation (Kung-Fu) with Critical Comments On Theories of Qi

Fri, 06 Mar 2026 10:37:37 GMT

title: 以工夫之進路衡定張載的義理系統兼評氣學之說;Clarification and Establishing Zhang Zai’s Philosophy by The Approach of Moral Cultivation (Kung-Fu) with Critical Comments On Theories of Qi abstract: 本文緊扣宋明儒「天道性命相貫通」之共識，通過釐清「思辨理性」與「實踐理性」、「思辨形上學」與「道德形上學」之分判，確立宋明儒學和張載(橫渠)的本體與工夫之要義，即由道德工夫實踐以證天、理、性、命之實踐意義，確立成德必通過心性的工夫實踐來完成，不但是由工夫實踐以成聖成賢，更糾正許多由「思辨理性」或「知識進路」論述之不切合張載(張橫渠)義理之弊，或只論其天道論、氣論等之不諦和不相應之處。本文由工夫的進路詮釋和回應橫渠「窮理盡性至命」之工夫次序、與由早期有感於「盡性」而不能「定性」，中晚期轉向「心能盡性」、「大心」與「知禮成性」之「變化氣質」以成德、成聖之工夫問題，重新衡定橫渠之義理系統，旨在證成張載學和宋明儒者之形上學，正如牟宗三先生所洞見的，是以孔子為「以人體法」的聖人境界所體證的與天合德的最高道德人格的表現，是「成德之教」之「道德的形上學」。本文認為張載把「太虛即氣」之「氣」帶入天道性命的「論域」，從氣化流行中說明宇宙以天道之誠為體、建立物與無妄之真實性，在破「二氏崇虛之見」中所扮演的重要角色。橫渠以「太虛」回應和修正佛老說「空」、說「無」，正是橫渠對抗佛道「空」、「無」之學的利器，亦是橫渠重構儒家的心性論與「道德形上學」之特色，值得持續關注與深入研究，但不能以「氣論」來解讀橫渠之義理。若純為宇宙論的建構，如楊儒賓之以氣學為一詮釋宇宙實相之學，或附屬於宋明儒學之道德形上學，以補儒家之「論性不論氣不備」之缺，自可自成一派，但不可以視為儒學之本義，更不可以橫渠之學為「氣學」，因其工夫論仍然是以儒家的心性論（特別是心之工夫實踐之能力）之工夫以成就道德人格，最高自是由孔孟易庸而來的聖人之義。由於氣論不能建立成聖之工夫，即可證一切詮釋橫渠哲學為「氣學」之說都不相應，也無法成立。;This Dissertation follows closely the consensus of Song-Ming Confucianism on the thesis of " The Dao of Heaven and Xing-Ming are One” and by the clarification of the distinction of theoretical reason and practical reason, as well as the discursive metaphysics and moral metaphysics, I try to explicate clearly in this dissertation the meanings of ben-ti and kung-fu for Song-Ming Confucians, (for Zhang Zai as well), the practical meanings of Heaven(tien)、Li(Reason)、Xing(moral Nature) and Ming(Mandate). And by this way, we realize not only that the one and only way to cultivate our moral personality must take the moral practice or kung fu through the operations of our xin (moral Mind) and xing within our daily moral practice, but reject as impossible that many of the suggestions to interpret the philosophy of Zhang Zai(Chang Heng-qu) by theoretical or epistemological approaches as invalid. For those that interpret Zhang Zai’s philosophy based only upon his sayings on the theories of Heavenly Mandate, and/or Qi is false and invalid. Our approach of moral cultivation or kung fu has the merits in its validity in the explications of Zhang Zai’s main thesis of the order of moral cultivation implied in the saying of “investigation of Reason to the ultimate, realization fully our Heavenly invested Nature and recovering of our Heavenly Mandate within our lives,” as well as his earlier puzzle in the “indeterminacy of moral providence” in our moral practice and his diverse ways of moral practice in his middle and final stages that changed to “(only)xin could extend our xing to the full”¸ moral practice is “ the expansion of our xin (moral mind) to the full” and “the transformation and transcending of our inborn material bodily desire and limitations with the moral practice of “aligning with li so as to realize to the full meaning of our xing”. In such moral explications we renew our understanding of Zhang Zai’s Confucianism. In a word, my dissertation if a justification of Zhang Zai and Song-Ming Confucian moral metaphysics. This falls squarely what Mou Sung-san’s insightful indications that Confucianism takes that Confucius is the sage that embodies the Heavenly Dao with his live, and reach the peak of a sage whose live is one with Heaven in morality. and his teaching is a teaching of a moral metaphysics built upon moral practice. And, I regard Zhang Zai’s introducing of the concept of qi into the exposition of” tien Dao and xing ming is One” in his creative thesis of “tai-xu (pure emptiness) is qi” is an attempt explicate how the cheng (sincerity) of the Dao of Heaven realizes itself in the material evolution of the cosmos so as to consolidate the reality of matter and the refutation of “the unfounded praising of the emptiness and unreality of the world uphold by Buddhism and Taoism.” Such theory of qi could be a different kind of metaphysics proposed by Chinese philosophers such as Yang Yu-ben, and it has its own value, but it could not be used in the explication of the philosophy of Zhang Zai nor Song-Ming Confucianism in general. For, the core ideas and foundation of Confucianism lies with the moral practice of our daily lives and its goal is to upgrades our lives to the highest moral personality of a sage, while theories of qi could not provide practitioners such a goal. It means that theories of qi have no proper validity in the explication of Confucianism and the goal for the practitioners to be a sage.

程明道之一本論：工夫進路之詮釋;The yi-ben lun(One-Source theory) of Cheng Mingdao：An Interpretation with Moral Cultivation or kung-fu Approach

Fri, 17 Oct 2025 03:56:38 GMT

title: 程明道之一本論：工夫進路之詮釋;The yi-ben lun(One-Source theory) of Cheng Mingdao：An Interpretation with Moral Cultivation or kung-fu Approach abstract: 中文摘要本文以儒家的道德德實踐即道德工夫的進路重新詮釋程明道的「一本論」之義理，主要是彰顯「一本論」在程明道的義理的核心意義，以及「一本論」對儒家道德體系的重要性及特殊的貢獻。本文首先說明先秦儒家與宋明儒學乃是一成德之教，即以道德實踐成聖為為核心，而工夫正是儒家用以達成此成聖之目標和聖人的境界所呈現的形上學，即，道德形上學之實義。是以，本文一方面確立儒家成德之教的入手工夫起點是在日常的道德實踐之中，由此展開此成德之教的歷程，最高達到聖賢的位階，全面呈現儒家由工夫所證成的宇宙和生命的實相。〈定性書〉與〈識仁篇〉是程明道論道德工夫最全面的和最具有創造性的詮釋，也是相應同時代的張橫渠和他最名的學生呂大臨兩人先後在工夫實踐上的問題而來。〈定性書〉是回答張橫渠在工夫上的一個重要困難：「定性未能不動，猶累于外物」，即，在道德實踐工夫上，何以要按性體而行以成聖，卻常受外物的影響而不能成功？本文認為明道是直就積極工夫的方式來回應，指出對治之道是工夫之實踐中達到「內外兩忘」、「無分內外」，「不自私用智」，正如天地(即天道)之回應事事物物而沒有私心，聖人之回應天萬物之情狀而沒有自己的私情，如此，則顯示聖人之工夫可以達至如天地般能秉持大公無私的態度而順萬事萬物之理回應，特別是在激怒之中而得「喜怒之正」，即怒而無不合理之處。本文之分析可證明程明道之工夫正是實踐一本論而來。而〈識仁篇〉所示之工夫路數，首要在「識仁」，由識仁以確立道德實踐之成聖的方向。明道在此所謂「識仁」乃是呈現仁體（仁心）之「覺識」並非知解亦非玄想空談之事，乃是要切切實實按仁心之自我要求、隨時隨處精誠力行於日常生活中。因為仁體（仁心）既已呈現，工夫只是以「誠敬存之」，誠是保持仁心之真實性，而敬是使此一仁心之真實性相續無間斷，因此，「誠敬存之」的工夫使我們的道德實踐持久而不怠，則此仁心愈存愈明，最終使我們能達到聖人的位階。程明道以「仁者」「仁者與萬物為一體」之聖人境界表達「仁體」之實義，此即牟宗三先生借用佛家語所說的「以人表法」之義。對於明道所言之「一本」，本文採取牟宗三先生的「直貫義」和唐君毅先生的「一體相感」義，由兩個不同的角度來作一更深度的說明，牟宗三先生主要以直貫創生來詮釋之，而唐君毅先生以「一體相感」義作不同的重點詮釋，本文旨在揭示如此「直貫義」與「一體相感」義並存和統貫為一，方能充分領會明道「一本論」之實義，並結合工夫進路的詮釋方法，這是本文的對程明道的儒學義理的一個新的詮釋，由此可以使明道之精要而又圓融的一本論的全幅意義。綜言之，本文進一步揭示出程明道之「一本論」乃真相應於孔孟圓盈之教之規模而調適上遂的發展，由此充實地發揚程明道學問之義理綱維，不論是客觀面言道體、性體或主觀面講本心、心體，皆圓融地兼備並蓄，而呈現出程明道眾多圓融之詞，如「天人是一」、「道器是一」等圓頓之說法，意味著人與天之區隔與差別已被泯除。但本文也指出，這是說法上差別相的泯除，而非存有論上互相對反的存在的泯除。換言之，程明道在「一本論」之思維脈絡下，將天道、性理之道德的、形而上的實體通過進德修業(心的作用)落實下來，此「心性天是一」已由分解說進至非分解說，其所言之「窮理盡性以至於命，三事一時並了」的工夫更有圓頓化境上是一的「圓教」義。而明道所謂的「善固性也，然惡亦不可不謂之性也」的說法，盡顯對於相互對反的一切法與存在都能圓融並存的「詭譎相即」之義，由此可證程明道之「一本論」確實為儒家圓教之模型，是程明道在工夫與實踐所至之高度義理之體現，不愧為宋明儒共尊之儒者。最後，本文深究程明道之一本論作為一種內在論(interalism)如何提供一個儒家式的道德判斷與道德動力結合的論述，以更展開道德實踐中之實踐理性之新領域。;Abstract In this dissertation, I make a break-through by employing the moral cultivation (kung fu) approach in the interpretation of Cheng Mingdao’s yi-ben lun(One-Source Theory) so as to expose the core of his Confucianism, and the significance of his contribution to Confucianism for pre-Qin as well as for the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism. This paper first gives an account showing clearly that the core of Confucianism is a theory of moral cultivation for one to be a sage with some details of how to practice kung-fu and how it transforms our life into a sage with Confucius as the model. Moral cultivation or kung fu is the practical way for anyone to achieve the status of a sage and the metaphysics that is shown or established by Confucianism, that is a moral metaphysics rather than a speculative one by thinking or analysis. For Confucianism as a theory of moral cultivation, it begins with our moral practice in ordinary lives and by self-conscious practice of kung-fu daily, we start the journey of becoming a self-achieved sage as well as what is the reality of life and the Universe. The two famous essays by Cheng Mingdao are the dingxing shu and shiren pian, on moral cultivation and its problems, which are presented by his contemporary Zhang Hengqu and his most famous disciple Lui Talin in their practice of moral cultivation. Both are essays expressing Cheng Mingdao’s ideas on kung-fu. In dingxing shu Cheng Mingdao responds to Zhang Hengqu’s question of “while one wants to remain calm and steadiness when doing moral cultivation but one seems forever burden with problems from external source.” In this paper, I take it that Mingdao is offering a strictly positive way of moral cultivation, that is, the best way of countering such disturbances is making our practice achieving the “forgetting both in or outside”, “no separation of inside and outside”, “not being selfish and employing self-regarding intelligence” but acting without any selfish motivations but with justice to all. Especially in face of great furiousness, on could act like sage showing with reason even in such situation. I show how this sagely way of action is in fact in line with the yi-ben theory. Furthermore, in his shiren pian, Mingdao urges us the need to showing how we first know what is ren or ren-xin (the Mind of Ren) so that we make the right moral practice towards the making of sage with our effort. Mingdao makes it clear that this “knowing” is not a kind of discursive or metaphysical way of knowing it as a piece of knowledge or speculation, but the actual practice of ren and acts honestly in line with the truthfulness of our ren-ti or ren-xin(moral mind). That means we have to keep it without intermission. This is called keep ren or ren-xin with respect, so that it becomes the guiding force that leads us ultimately into sainthood. The sage is a person with full-blown realization of ren in every respect. This is what Mou Tsung-san called the personalizing of ren with one’s personality. We have two main interpretations of Mingdao′s yi-ben lun(One-Source theory). Mou Zongsan mainly interprets it in terms of “the metaphysical and the physical are directly connected and become one in a vertical creative way”(直貫義), while Tang Chun-i′s interpretation emphasizes its “all things in the universal unified with all as one body and there is a compassionate feelingbetweeneach other”(一體相感義), Only by combining these two interpretations can we fully realize the true meaning of Mingdao′s yi-ben lun(One-Source theory). This dissertation give a new interpretation of the philosophy of Cheng Mingdao so as to offer a full understanding of his encompassing and rich theory. Mingdao′s yi-ben(One-Source theory) truly corresponds to the scope of the perfect teachings of Confucius and Mencius. In the One Source Theory objective Dao-ti(道體) and Xing-ti(性體), and the subjective xin and Xin-ti(心體) are harmoniously integrated into a whole body under the kung-fu teaching and moral practice, such as “Heaven and human beings are one” and “Dao(道) and chi(器) are one” This indicates that the separation and differences between human beings and Heaven have been eliminated. In other words, his One Source Theory presents in a non-analytical way that transcended the analytical divisive way of distinction. However this is the elimination of differences in a non-analytical way of presentation, rather than the annihilation of ontologically opposed existences. Thus in his yi-ben lun, Mingdao integrates the Dao of Heaven(天道), the moral and metaphysical entity of Xing-Li(性理) through moral cultivation (functions of the mind) and hence, xin(moral Mind), xing (human nature性), and Heaven(天) are one is a non-analytical way of presentation of moral metaphysics. He regards the moral cultivation of “exhaustive understanding Li(窮理)，and exhaustive achievement of Xing(盡性) to the Mandate of Heaven(至命) as finished completely in one act. That means in one moral act, we have been successfully done the same thing as a sage though only in a single aspect. However, it leads to the status of sage if we practice such moral cultivation without intermission, we shall finally come to be a sage. Also, Mingdao′s declaration that “goodness is part of human nature, but so is evil” fully demonstrates the meaning of “paradoxical coexistence of the opposites as one”, is a teaching encompassed within his One Source Theory that all mutually contradictory laws and existences can coexist harmoniously as one whole body. This shows that Cheng Mingdao′s yi-ben lun(One-Source theory) is indeed a model of Confucianism′s perfect teaching. Finally, I try to show why and how his theory is an kind of internalism and it provides a Confucian way of explanation of the necessary connection of moral judgment and moral motivation so as to probe further a new way of understanding our moral reality.

利他主義之實踐合理性探究——以Thomas Nagel的理性道德為進路;An Inquiry into the Practical Rationality of Altruism from the Path of Thomas Nagel’s Rational Morality

Fri, 17 Oct 2025 03:56:20 GMT

title: 利他主義之實踐合理性探究——以Thomas Nagel的理性道德為進路;An Inquiry into the Practical Rationality of Altruism from the Path of Thomas Nagel’s Rational Morality abstract: 本論文主要探討人際互動中產生的利己與利他行為動機，分析理性與情感之間的交互影響。從心理利己主義、倫理利己主義，與利他主義之間的關係，闡明經由理性支持利他行為，將其確立為道德義務。主要依循Thomas Nagel對「他人實在性」的認知動機，以及將自身視為「眾人之一」的理性自覺，透過所論述的「理性一致性」與「本然的觀點」等理論，詮釋道德判斷的基礎。這些道德判斷不但來自個體視角的感知經驗，更透過理性所推論出的普遍義務。同時參考Thomas Michael Scanlon所提出的「沒有人能合理地拒絕」原則，使道德義務成為普遍且正當的規範要求；Derek Parfit認為，唯有當我們的行動符合普遍性原則，方能真正維繫對自我與他人的尊重。進一步依循Henry Sidgwick的「不偏不倚」原則，得以理解道德義務應建立於具備理性可證成的倫理立場，其道德判斷必須超越個體主觀的偏好與情感，進而採取達到普遍快樂的客觀立場。據此，本文依循「沒有人能合理地拒絕」原則與「最樂觀」原則，置於 Nagel「本然的觀點」視角轉換架構，旨在協助個體於道德行動的權衡中，超越當下的自利考量，實現對當代與未來世代福祉的理性關懷。是以，本論文試圖建構一個利他的「合理性理由–道德義務–倫理價值」的理性利他實踐架構。依「合理性理由」確立道德義務的動機正當性，「道德義務」作為行動的規範基礎，「倫理價值」則奠基於理性義務的普遍快樂價值。最後，依 Nagel 所揭示的「荒謬感」，試圖以突現理論轉化為最優倫理價值祈嚮。依循《周易》中「順應性命之理」與「成性存存」的義理，使人在理性與倫理實踐中實現自我與關懷他人，於生命實踐中展現內在利他主義。 ;This thesis investigates the rational foundation of altruism and argues that moral obligations can be justified through reason rather than emotional impulses. While sympathy may spark altruistic actions, reason offers a more stable and universal basis for consistent moral behavior. By comparing psychological egoism, ethical egoism, and altruism, this study highlights how altruism can be grounded as a rational moral duty. This study draws on Thomas Nagel’s moral philosophy, including his concepts such as the recognition of the other person’s reality, the rational awareness of being “someone among many,” the principle of rational consistency, and “the view from nowhere.” These ideas form the basis for understanding moral judgment not merely as a subjective response but as a rational recognition of universal moral duties that extend even to future generations. Incorporating T. M. Scanlon’s theory of “no one could reasonably reject,” it argues that moral obligations must be justifiable within a shared rational framework. Derek Parfit argues that only by acting on universally willable principles can we uphold respect for self and others, and ensure moral consistency and impartiality. Such rational principles ground moral action and advance a more just society. In accordance with Henry Sidgwick’s principle of impartiality, moral obligation should rest on a rationally justifiable ethical standpoint—one that transcends subjective preferences and aligns with the objective moral demands of universalistic hedonism. Therefore, this study proposes a triadic model of altruistic ethics, consisting of reasonable motivation, moral obligation, and ethical value. Reason legitimizes moral motivation, obligation provides the normative foundation, and ethical value arises from fulfilling rational duties aligned with universalistic hedonism. Finally, inspired by Nagel’s notion of “the sense of absurdity”—the tension between subjective experience and objective perspective—this thesis suggests such reflection can motivate ethical action. Through emergence theory and the Book of Changes, it argues for a synthesis of rational self-realization and care for others, ultimately grounding altruism as a reflective ethical practice.