摘要： We empirically investigate the role of country governance in the privatization of 113 government-owned banks from 1996 to 2007 across 39 countries. First, privatized banks tend to outperform non-privatized banks after the privatization, which is called the privatization effect. Second, we find that the privatization effect is much larger in developing countries compared to those in developed countries, suggesting that the privatization effect is systematically related to a country's level of economic development. Third, we discover that country governance enhances the privatization effect in developing countries, which is consistent with the hypothesis that countries with good governance can minimize the likelihood of political intervention via residual ownership. Conversely, we also find that country governance reduces the privatization effect in developed countries due to smaller spaces for improvement. 出版者： Greenwich: Elsevier Inc 出版日期： 2016-05 出處： International review of economics & finance, 2016-05, Vol.43, p.3-18 資源來源： ScienceDirect Journals 版權： 2015 Elsevier Inc. 版權： Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. May 2016 識別號： ISSN: 1059-0560 識別號： EISSN: 1873-8036 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2015.10.028
