摘要： Abstract<jats:label />We examine insurance markets with two‐dimensional asymmetric information on risk type and on preferences related to regret. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz (<jats:ext-link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="#jori12096-bib-0038" />), the equilibrium can be efficient; that is, it can coincide with the equilibrium under full information. Furthermore, we show that pooling, semipooling, and separating equilibria can exist. Specifically, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, the equilibrium includes a contract that is offered but not purchased. 其他題名： Journal Risk and Insurance 出版者： Malvern: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 出版日期： 2016-03 出處： Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2016-03, Vol.83 (1), p.181-216 資源來源： EBSCOhost Business Source Premier 版權： 2016 The American Risk and Insurance Association 版權： 2015 The Journal of Risk and Insurance 版權： COPYRIGHT 2016 American Risk and Insurance Association, Inc. 版權： American Risk and Insurance Association 識別號： ISSN: 0022-4367 識別號： EISSN: 1539-6975 識別號： DOI: 10.1111/jori.12096
