摘要： This paper investigates how to design down-and-out barrier options contracts so as firms invest when it is socially efficient. A government initially offers a firm a privileged right to exercise an investment opportunity that exhibits external benefits to society, but will eliminate this opportunity if its prospects are sufficiently bleak. The firm will invest at the date further away from that is socially efficient if the firm either is less uncertain about the return of the investment or incurs lower investment costs, or the government owns a more valuable knock-out option. Consequently, under these three scenarios the government can efficiently either offer the firm a higher investment tax credit or impose the firm a higher lease fee for holding the option to invest. 出版者： London: Routledge 出版日期： 2016-12-07 出處： The European journal of finance, 2016-12, Vol.22 (15), p.1561-1579 資源來源： Taylor & Francis Journals 版權： 2015 Taylor & Francis 2015 版權： 2015 Taylor & Francis 識別號： ISSN: 1351-847X 識別號： EISSN: 1466-4364 識別號： DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2015.1040169
