摘要： Do firms’ governance provisions affect their terms of obtaining external financing? We hypothesize that it is more difficult for firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights to raise external equity, and that since analyst coverage is an important part of underwriting services, underwriters would use analyst recommendations to promote issuing firms with weaker shareholder rights more strongly and charge them higher underwriting fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that analyst recommendations on issuing firms with weak shareholder rights increase more than those with strong shareholder rights prior to SEOs, and that underwriting spreads are positively related to issuing firms’ shareholder rights as proxied by the G‐index. Furthermore, the effect of shareholder rights on underwriting fees is largely contained in the six provisions in the E‐index. 其他題名： Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 出版者： Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 出版日期： 2013-11 出處： Journal of business finance & accounting, 2013-11, Vol.40 (9-10), p.1276-1303 資源來源： Wiley Online Library - AutoHoldings Journals 版權： 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 版權： Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Nov/Dec 2013 識別號： ISSN: 0306-686X 識別號： EISSN: 1468-5957 識別號： DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12026
