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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/105867


    題名: In-house capability and supply chain decisions
    作者: 王曉雯;Balachandran, Kashi R.;Wang, Hsiao-Wen;Li, Shu-Hsing;Wang, Taychang
    貢獻者: 管理學院會計研究所
    關鍵詞: Benchmarks;Contractors;Coordinated supply chains;Decision analysis;Game theory;In house;In-house capability;Information sharing;Informationsverbreitung;Kapazit�tsplanung;Lieferkette;Misappropriation;Outsourcing;Production management;Spieltheorie;Studies;Subcontractors;Supply chain management;Supply chains
    日期: 2013-04-01
    上傳時間: 2026-04-23 12:58:21 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Elsevier BV;Oxford: Elsevier Ltd
    摘要: 摘要: This study considers an internal production option for a contractor and analyzes its effect on the supply chain decisions when the contractor has innovated and the subcontractor has an incentive for opportunistic behavior. In contrast to the single disclosure threshold in the benchmark scenario where the contractor lacks in-house capability, we find two thresholds in the referred scenario. When information misappropriation is possible and the contractor has in-house capability, the contractor will organize a coordinated supply chain only when innovations fall between the two thresholds. Compared to the benchmark scenario, in-house capability has a positive effect on the contractor's incentive to innovate and an ambiguous effect on the subcontractor's incentive to invest in the production process. When the contractor needs to incur an extra cost to build in-house capability, the contractor keeps the same levels of investment compared to the case of no additional in-house capability cost, whereas the subcontractor increases the levels of investment. Furthermore, we find that in the presence of potential misappropriation on the part of the subcontractor, the higher the level of in-house capability, the less likely the contractor will be to outsource innovative products that generate higher profitability. This study can explain why firms strategically outsource low-end products and produce high-end products themselves. This study provides new results on the effects of in-house capability on the strategic interactions of parties in supply chains and, hence, on supply chain efficiency. ► We explore how in-house capability affects the contractor's supply chain decisions. ► The contractor with in-house capability has two thresholds in disclosing innovation. ► The contractor with in-house capability will outsource products that generate higher profitability. ► We provide new results about the effects of in-house capability on supply chain efficiency.
    出版者: Oxford: Elsevier Ltd
    出版日期: 2013-04-01
    出處: Omega (Oxford), 2013-04, Vol.41 (2), p.473-484
    版權: 2012 Elsevier Ltd
    版權: Copyright Pergamon Press Inc. Apr 2013
    識別號: ISSN: 0305-0483
    識別號: EISSN: 1873-5274
    識別號: DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2012.01.003
    識別號: CODEN: OMEGA6
    顯示於類別:[會計研究所 ] 期刊論文

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