摘要： This paper analyzes the optimal taxation policy in a mixed duopoly when the private firm is jointly owned by domestic and foreign investors. The optimal policy is tax if the foreign shareholding is high enough; otherwise, it should be subsidy. Besides, to obtain a higher welfare, the taxation policy is superior to the privatization policy only when the private firm is mainly domestically owned. However, when full foreign shareholding of the private firm is allowed, the taxation and privatization can obtain the same level of social welfare regardless of the public firm's marginal cost. 出版者： Routledge 出版日期： 2016-07-02 出處： Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2016-07, Vol.23 (3), p.342-355 資源來源： Taylor & Francis Journals: Bodleian Libraries collection 版權： 2016 City University of Hong Kong and National Taiwan University 2016 識別號： ISSN: 1608-1625 識別號： EISSN: 2164-2257 識別號： DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2016.1188448
