Government deposit insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig model

NCU Institutional Repository > 管理學院 > 財務金融研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/29547

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题名:	Government deposit insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig model
作者:	McCulloch,JH;Yu,MT
贡献者:	財務金融所
关键词:	BANK RUNS;LIQUIDITY
日期:	1998
上传时间:	2010-06-29 20:30:39 (UTC+8)
出版者:	中央大學
摘要:	The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their "sequential servicing constraint" to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing without tax-based deposit insurance, even when the number of "type 1" agents is stochastic, by employing a "contingent bonus contract." The threat of disintermediation noted by Jacklin [1987] in the nonstochastic case is still present but can be blocked by contractual trading restrictions. This article complements Wallace [1988], who considers an alternative resolution of this inconsistency.
關聯:	GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE THEORY
显示于类别:	[財務金融研究所] 期刊論文

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