本文首先以權利理論的觀點來論證死亡權的合理性，以霍菲爾德、德沃金與格衛斯三者所提出的觀點，討論權利特性應用於死亡權之意義。 筆者再以辛格之偏好功利主義的觀點，探討死亡權的道德性。殺害有理性和有自我意識的生命，不同於殺害其他生命。辛格提出四種理由支持人格個體的生命高於其它只有感知力生命的價值。若人格個體希望死去的前提下，上述四種理由亦可以用來支持人格個體自願死亡的有利論點。換言之，只有人格個體才能擁有死亡的權利。在病患減輕痛苦方面所擁有的利益，辛格提供了一個基本的平等原則，利益平等考量原則在倫理慎思中，要我們對受行為影響的所有對象的類似利益予以同等程度的考慮。 若死亡是病人的權利，其他人便負有消極不得妨礙的義務，在某些國家裡甚至將積極死亡權，由道德權利制定為法定的權利，於是在制定嚴格條件下，國家便負有積極提供致死動作的義務。 This thesis tries first to prove the rationality and meaning of of right to die from the points of view of right theories put forward by Hohfeld, Dworkin and Gewirth. I then use Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism for the justification of right to die. The murdering of a rationally and self conscious life is quite different from the murdering of other sentient lives. Singer puts forward four kinds of reasons and supports the life of a person as having a higher value. They supports the right to life of such beings. However, if a person want to die the above argument also lend support to his or her request. In other words, only a person has the right to die. If a patient has the right to die, other people will have obligation passively not to hinder and positively to help the manifestation of this right.
