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    题名: 高階經理人誘因機制隊公司財務槓桿之影響
    作者: 王錦燕;Melody Wang
    贡献者: 人力資源管理研究所碩士在職專班
    关键词: 誘因機制;總經理介入董事會;財務槓桿;Incentive System;Involvement of General Manager in the Board;Financial Leverage
    日期: 2012-01-30
    上传时间: 2012-06-15 20:33:32 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 一般而言,誘因機制的設計主要目的在解決代理問題,但是當此機制的過分強調時,是否會引發高階經理人藉著財務槓桿的操作,獲得看似良好的公司績效,而不當財務槓桿的操作,隱含更為嚴重的代理問題與企業財務風險。爰此,本研究主要探討高階經理人薪酬誘因機制的設計與總經理對董事會介入程度,是否會使高階經理人產生風險性的行為,增加企業財務槓桿。 本研究對280家上市公司按產業別分成傳統產業、電子通訊產業、服務業等三類,並分別進行迴歸分析。實證結果顯示服務業的企業提供高階經理誘因機制,會增加公司財務槓桿效果,而另二類產業則無此現象。此外,本研究也發現誘因機制對財務槓桿之影響會隨總經理對董事會的介入而有所不同,惟此調節效果會因財務槓桿衡量指標不同,而發生在不同產業。In general, the purpose of incentive system is to solve agency problems. However, when the system is over-emphasized, chief executives may manipulate financial leverage to show an outstanding performance of the enterprise. The improper manipulation of financial leverage may cause serious agency problems and financial risk of the enterprise. In this study, correlation between increase of company financial leverage and financial incentives for chief executives, in addition to involvement of general managers in the board has been analyzed. Regression analysis was performed in analyzing data from 280 public trades companies in Taiwan, which were divided into three categories, traditional industries, electronic manufacturing/communication industries and service industries. The result has shown that in service industries, the increase of financial leverage is strongly correlated to the salary and performance of chief executives as a result of emphasis on incentive. The phenomenon doesn't exist in the two other industries. In addition, the effects of incentive systems on financial leverage are different in different extent of the involvement of general manager in board ,which shows in different industries because of different measurement index of leverage.
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