CEO/CFO 權益誘因與未預期審計公費的關聯;CEO and CFO Equity Incentives and Unexpected Audit Fees

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/74592

Title:	CEO/CFO 權益誘因與未預期審計公費的關聯;CEO and CFO Equity Incentives and Unexpected Audit Fees
Authors:	陳威宇;Chen, Wei-Yu
Contributors:	會計研究所
Keywords:	代理理論;未預期審計公費;權益誘因;delta;vega;審計人員觀點;agency theory;unexpected audit fees;equity incentives;delta;vega;the auditor perspective
Date:	2017-07-17
Issue Date:	2017-10-27 14:19:34 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	誘因薪酬被設計用來解決代理問題，但自 2001 年開始會計醜聞不斷爆發，引起各界對於誘因薪酬的質疑。由於審計人員對於資本市場的重要性，政府單位開始制定相關準則要求審計人員在查核時考慮管理階層誘因薪酬，研究人員也紛紛以研究人員觀點進行相關研究。在近代的審計研究中，合理的審計公費被認為是審計人員考慮公司所有資訊後所訂定的，當審計公費出現研究人員無法解釋的情形，反映的是審計人員觀點，審計人員認為應該要收取的公費水準。本研究以審計人員觀點詮釋誘因薪酬是否對於審計公費的制定產生影響，以美國標準普爾 1500 公司為樣本，我們選擇 CEO 與 CFO 進行探討，並以delta(股票價格對管理階層財富變化的敏感度)與vega(股票報酬波動對管理階層財富變化的敏感度)作為誘因薪酬的衡量。實證結果顯示：一、審計人員確實會在審計公費定價時考慮誘因薪酬。二、審計人員在審計公費定價時會比較重視 delta 誘因。三、審計人員在審計公費定價時會比較重視 CEO 的誘因薪酬。;The accounting scandals continue to break out since 2001. Various parties have questioned that the incentive-based contracts are the solution to the agency problem. Given that auditors are important participants in capital markets, the authorities begin to develop related guidelines to require auditors to consider managerial incentive compensations into the audit process. Researchers also start to study this issue, using the researcher perspective. In contemporary auditing literature, audit fees are considered to include all firms’ information. However, researchers can’t explain the composition of all audit fees. The part of the fees that researchers can’t explain, but auditors do charge due to their domain knowledge, which are called unexpected audit fees, reflecting the auditor perspective. This study uses the auditor perspective to investigate the relationship between executive incentives and unexpected audit fees. Using a sample of US S&P 1500 firms, we discuss the incentive compensations of CEOs and CFOs. We use two measures of equity incentives, the sensitivity of the value of executives’ equity portfolios to changes in stock price (delta incentive) and to changes in stock return volatility (vega incentive). We document our results below. (1)We find an association between executive incentives and unexpected audit fees, which mean that auditors do concern executive incentives in audit planning. (2) Our results support that auditors pay more attention on delta incentives than vega incentives. (3) Our results support that auditors care more about CEOs’ incentives than CFOs’ incentives.
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