A model of instituion design-How bank bailout policy affect ex-ante incentive

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Title:	A model of instituion design-How bank bailout policy affect ex-ante incentive
Authors:	李軒;Lee, Hsuan
Contributors:	經濟學系
Keywords:	金融危機;救助政策;太大不能倒;Too big to failed;bailout policy;institution design;financial crisis
Date:	2020-07-02
Issue Date:	2020-09-02 17:33:43 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	在2008 年金融海嘯中我觀察到如雷曼兄弟等＂Too big to failed＂的大型金融機構即使在危機發生時仍然有恃無恐，繼續進行一些高槓桿的投資，因為他們相信即使倒閉政府也會因為會產生很大的系統性風險而出手救助。本文旨在探討如何設計一套事後的救助政策來影響＂Too big to failed＂的大型金融機構事前的投資。;In the 2008 financial crisis, I observe those so-called“too big to failed＂financial institutions such as lehman brothers still engage in highly risky investments after the crisis happened. They believe that if they go bankrupt the government will bail them out no matter what. And they can still engage in those high leverage investment because even if the investment failed, the government will still save them by letting taxpayers bear the consequences. In this paper, we discuss how ex-ante “too big to failed＂problems and the ex-post dishonest of the bankruptcy will affect social welfare. We are on the side of the government to design the bailout policy trying to minimize the inefficiency caused by asymmetric information.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Economics] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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